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Language, Status, and State Loyalty in Ukraine

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Between 1989, when Ukrainian was proclaimed the sole "state language," and 2012, when Russian was established as a "regional" language, the language question in Ukraine has generated periodic rounds of political contestation. Language was a key factor accounting for regionally polarized electoral contests in presidential and parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2012.[1] The swift repeal of the 2012 language law in February 2014, a day after the Ukrainian parliament removed Viktor Yanukovych as president, has brought the controversy to a new level, as the annexation of Crimea and the armed insurrection-cum-Russian military intervention in the Donbas have been presented as defensive measures protecting Russian speakers.[2]

The cyclical nature of language conflict—when language grievances suddenly become salient on the political agenda, take a back seat, reacquire their salience, and so forth—far from being unique to Ukraine, is in fact the norm in political units where language acts as a marker of identity.[3] Ukraine, however, stands out as a case where an enduring political consensus has yet to occur over the foundational aspects of language politics, namely, the political status of the two main languages fighting for public space (Ukrainian and Russian) and state regulations aimed at providing incentives to use the socially disadvantaged language (Ukrainian). The relatively low level of legal culture, or the weak state of the rule of law in Ukraine, is an aggravating, yet probably not determinative, factor in this long-term quest for political compromise.

Until 2012, a brittle political consensus was built around the symbolic preeminence of Ukrainian (Ukrainian as the sole "state" language), state incentives to use Ukrainian (strong in schools, but weak at work and in the media and book publishing), and an acceptance of the informal oral predominance of Russian in cities outside of western Ukraine, including in state institutions.[4] The 2012 law shattered the political equilibrium by removing state incentives to learn and use Ukrainian. The persistent dominance of Russian in cities was politically acceptable only as long as the state was perceived as promoting, symbolically and in its policies, the development and ascendance of Ukrainian.

In signaling that Russian speakers need not use Ukrainian at all, the 2012 law overturned the core principle around which the 1989 Ukraine language law, or for that matter most language laws around the world, are devised.

The 2014 vote to repeal the law was met by a hail of criticism, even though the law's core principles had been criticized by EU institutions and the repeal simply meant a return to the pre-2012 consensus that de facto tolerated the urban predominance of Russian. As it became clear that the measure was unwise symbolically and in its political timing, Interim President Oleksandr Turchynov exercised his veto, while in practice the controversial articles of the law—such as a clause allowing provincial administrations to send official documents to the central government in Russian—have certainly not been implemented since. Russia couched the impact of these measures in the most extreme terms,[5] but, crucially, not in the language of *rights*. The narrative that took hold in the Russian-controlled media and among local insurgents in Donbas was not one of protection of language rights within a bilingual state, but of physical protection against the illegitimacy of the very regime seen as imposing these policies.

As events on the ground were to make clear in Crimea and Donbas, the Ukrainian language came to symbolize the very state against which one needed protection. What this meant in practice is that in the territories not controlled by the Ukrainian state, there is virtually no public space left for the Ukrainian language. Achieving a robust consensus over the foundations of language politics and seeking a political settlement in Donbas have thus become two separate tasks.[6]

Armed combatants in Donbas and their Russian patrons have made it very clear that they are seeking Russian linguistic hegemony in their "republics," a politically unsustainable demand in any "federal" or "decentralized" arrangement in multilingual states. Elsewhere in Ukraine, including in the areas of Donbas under Ukrainian control, the language situation is qualitatively different and may have evolved in an unprecedented manner since Maidan.

The war in Donbas has potentially had a profound impact on the *psychology* of language politics in Ukraine. An important shift may have occurred, placing the language question on a different plane than the one that characterized twenty years of cyclical contestation over the public use of languages. To simplify a far more complex ethnolinguistic cartography, Ukraine can be divided into three territorial groups: central and western Ukrainians speaking Ukrainian, eastern and southern Ukrainians speaking Russian, and Russians in eastern Ukraine speaking Russian.[7] Going back to the 1920s, Ukrainian "state-builders" have espoused the notion that Russian-speaking Ukrainians are the products of imperial Russian and Soviet policies of "Russification" and that a successful language policy should make them, and their children, transfer linguistically to Ukrainian as their language of preference.[8]

This stance was always resented by Russian-speaking eastern Ukrainians, as it sent the signal that Ukrainian speakers were the "true" Ukrainians.[9] To compound the problem, the language estrangement made eastern Ukrainians vote en masse for parties, and presidential candidates, professing a political affinity with Russia. The polarized electoral results between 1994 and 2012 were grounded in polarized orientations towards Russian (language status) and Russia (general foreign policy orientation of the Ukrainian state).[10] This fed the perception among western Ukrainians that eastern Ukrainians are "pro-Russian," which only comforted Ukrainian-language activists in their determination to "de-Russify" Ukraine.

The war in Donbas, however, has produced a dramatic disengagement of language from state loyalty. The Russian state and Russian nationalist movements in eastern Ukraine, which raised their heads for the first time in Ukraine after the fall of President Yanukovych, conceive of Russian speakers as ontologically loyal to Russia and its so-called Russian World (*Russkii mir*).[11] In this vision, as explicitly stated by President Putin in April 2014, half of Ukraine—the entirety of eastern and southern Ukraine—does not thus legitimately belong to Ukraine, since most easterners are Russian speakers.[12] Maidan was presented as a "coup d'état" and an assault on the *Russkii mir* that would lead to the breakup of Ukraine.

The war in Donbas, however, upended these expectations. While the Maidan demonstrations had provoked a certain malaise and a belief among a plurality or majority in eastern and southern Ukraine that they were caused by "nationalism" and western "political interests," eliciting once again a regional polarization in popular support,[13] Russian military intervention pushed these regions away from the Russian narrative. In opinion polls conducted in late 2014/early 2015, huge majorities in the east and south rejected the reality of Russian military intervention, the principle of Russia intervening to protect Russian speakers in Ukraine, the instauration of "federalism" in Ukraine, and either the independence or the Russian annexation of Donbas. While important regional variations could be observed in terms of supporting the conduct of the war by Ukraine, the results were not polarized, since southern Ukraine—which includes the key oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa—was divided on the question.[14]

The involvement of eastern Ukrainians in the war is tangible. The proportion of soldiers, in regular formations or volunteer battalions, from eastern Ukraine who have perished at the front fighting for Ukraine, even if proportionally below their demographic weight, is significant.[15] On the other hand, Ukrainians from the core nationalist provinces of Galicia in the geographic west, who were overrepresented on Maidan,[16] are in fact not overrepresented at the front. Armed combatants in Donbas, locals and from Russia, may claim to defend the cultural world of Russia, but far from fighting what they see as

culturally distant Ukrainian-speaking Galicians, a great many of the soldiers that they are engaging are Russian speakers from their imagined "New Russia" (*Novorossiia*). Moreover, most of the plethora of civic groups that have arisen to assist wholly underfunded army units and volunteer battalions are from the nearby eastern Ukrainian oblasts of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa, whose urban population is mostly Russian-speaking.

The irony of a war waged in the name of Russian speakers, and yet largely conducted in Russian on both sides of the front line, may be lost on Donbas combatants, but could have a long-term impact on Ukrainian language politics. Plainly stated, President Putin challenged the state loyalty of eastern Ukrainians. Outside of core Donbas, at least in the areas outside of Kyiv's control, they responded by expressing their loyalty to Ukraine. Academic literature since Ukrainian independence has presented eastern Ukrainians as ambivalent about their identity,[17] since they prefer to speak a language different from the language associated with their nationality (and since they shied away from voting for parties who see the Ukrainian language as a core component of Ukrainian identity). The unprecedented violation by Russia of the territorial integrity of Ukraine has dissipated the ambivalence: a significant majority of eastern Ukrainians identify with the Ukrainian state.

A reconfiguration of the relationship between language and state loyalty ("state-building") has taken place. As post-Maidan developments are suggesting, state loyalty does not correlate with the language that people prefer to speak.[18] It could, however, have more to do with their attitudes towards the Ukrainian language. Eastern Ukrainians, outside of core Donbas, prefer to speak Russian, but they are not antagonistic to Ukrainian—accepting to send their children to Ukrainian schools, to have Ukrainian signs in their towns, and to have Ukrainian predominate in central institutions of the state. In core Donbas, however, as was the case in pre-Maidan Crimea, the attitude to Ukrainian is different—to Ukrainian-language schools or public signs and to the very notion that a central state in Kyiv should primarily function in Ukrainian. Crimea and core Donbas are the two areas of Ukraine with the greatest concentration of ethnic Russians. The correlation, however, should not be confused with a causal factor. The argument is *not* that ethnic Russians in Ukraine tend to be hostile to Ukrainian and disloyal to the state, but rather that two different attitudes towards Ukrainian can be found in specific *territories* of eastern and southern Ukraine.

The cleavage core Donbas/rest of eastern Ukraine is reminiscent of a historical tension in late imperial Russia and the Soviet Union over the relationship between the Ukrainian language and state loyalty. "Little Russian" activists in imperial Kiev championed their regional cultural distinctness, and the uniqueness of the peasant vernacular, while Great Russian nationalists interpreted demands for state support of Ukrainian as a threat to the integrity

of the empire. The decrees banning the public use of Ukrainian in 1863 and 1876 reflected the latter view, while Little Russian officials on the ground were favorable to the recognition of linguistic diversity.[19] In the 1920s, Soviet officials were torn between the Leninist dictum that Ukrainian peasants will identify with the Soviet state if the state speaks to them in Ukrainian and the suspicion that the promotion of Ukrainian by intellectuals could lead to "separatism." The mistrust grew in the late 1920s and culminated in Stalin's assessment that Ukrainian resistance to the extreme rigors of collectivization was the direct result of linguistic indigenization (*korenizatsiia*)—the policy to make Ukrainian the language of the state.[20] The punishment for this Ukrainian defiance was the Holodomor. Afterwards, the public use of Ukrainian in the Soviet Union followed state-imposed strictures, and demands questioning the supremacy of Russian as the language of state organs were deemed "nationalist" and criminal.

Since Maidan, the views promulgated by Russia and Donbas armed combatants reinforce this imperial Russian nationalist/Stalinist historical notion that the Ukrainian language symbolizes "separatism" and betrayal of the Russian state. President Putin did not mince his words in his Crimea "Victory Speech": the instigators of a language policy infringing on Russian speakers are the descendants of those who collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II.[21] The association between the Ukrainian language and sedition is once again ominously made. This uncompromising view of the direct link between the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian "nationalism," however, has not spread to other areas of Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine. The historical analogy with imperial Russia and the early Soviet era has been reversed. Whereas the Little Russians and Soviet *korenizatsiia* officials conceived of regional distinctness within a larger state using Russian as the central language, contemporary Russian-speaking non–core Donbas eastern Ukrainians see themselves as part of Ukraine. Times of troubles—the 1905 Revolution, the chaos of collectivization—had decisively transformed central state ambivalence towards Ukrainian to a hardline view leaving no autonomous space for Ukrainian. The war in Donbas has had the contrary effect of affirming eastern Ukrainian state identity. The challenge for Ukrainian lawmakers is to take advantage of this new political landscape to devise a durable consensus over language policy in Ukraine. The next section will examine the theoretical foundations underpinning such a consensus.

The Three Factors of Language Contestation

There are three reasons as to why the status of languages and the regulation of their public uses can bring political contestation. The first pertains to *political legitimacy*, the second to the *fluidity of language practices*, and the third to

an *asymmetry in the social status of languages*. Political legitimacy rests on symbols. Language is a means of communication, but it is also imbued with symbolic meaning. The power of ethnonationalism lies on the stance that language can symbolize power. Decades after the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder posited that the nation originates in spoken language, rather than in a community historically linked to a state, nationalist entrepreneurs began making the claim that the distinct vernacular of their imagined group confers them rights ranging from language use protection to state independence. States, or substate territorial units, co-opting this nationalist narrative, promote the preeminent or exclusive use of the national language in public domains as a symbol of what they see as their legitimate right to exist as a distinct political entity. In this vision, the state is identified with the "state-forming" linguistically defined nation.

In Quebec, for instance, the legal status of French as the sole "official" language is premised on the notion that French is "the distinct language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking" and around which "that people has articulated its identity."[22] In Ukraine, despite some constitutional ambiguity in defining the nation in exclusive (ethnic) or inclusive (territorial) terms,[23] the Constitution, in making Ukrainian the sole "state language," is implicitly making the similar claim that the Ukrainian language symbolizes the "self" in a stated right of self-determination originating from a "centuries-old history of Ukrainian state-building."[24] The normative claim is linear: Ukraine is a state because Ukrainians are a distinct nation, and Ukrainians are a distinct nation because the language they speak is distinct.

This association between the Ukrainian language and territorial sovereignty, often couched in primordialist terms in public discourse,[25] is contested, as we saw, in Russia and in Donbas. The initiative to establish Russian as a "regional" language originated in Donbas, which, until February 2014, was the uncontested political home of the Party of Regions.[26] Donbas residents have consistently shown weak loyalty towards Ukraine.[27] For instance, in an August 2013 poll, at a time when Donetsk elites had been ruling in Kyiv for nearly four years, a majority (57 percent) regretted the state independence of Ukraine, twice the national average.[28] On the other hand, in an April 2014 poll specifically conducted in the eastern and southern oblasts of Ukraine (except Crimea), at the outset of an armed insurgency in Donbas, only close to 30 percent of Donbas residents were in favor of a unification with Russia.[29] Behind this apparent contradiction lies a preference against separation, *both* from Russia and Ukraine, an orientation epitomized by Belarus: formal sovereignty, actual cultural and political unity with Russia. The notion that the Ukrainian language symbolizes political rule in Ukraine clashes in Donbas with the counter-notion that Russian symbolizes an affiliation to the Russian cultural and political world (defined here as a space sharing the same political

orientation). As a result, Donbas was the only region in eastern and southern Ukraine where an overwhelmingly majority backed the option of Russian as a "state" language.[30]

The political saliency of language, however, is not limited to ethnonational claims. This would assume that language, in seemingly "nonnationalist" cases, can perform a purely communicative function, devoid of politically divisive symbolism or obligations. Yet establishing the language of a state, whether de facto or de jure, hardly results from neutral processes, notwithstanding the fact that language practices are invariably presented as "natural" by proponents of the linguistic status quo.[31] The classic case is that of Revolutionary France, which conceived of the "nation" in territorial terms, and yet over time socialized its population, a great many of whom spoke provincial idioms, into becoming French. French, the language of the Revolution, became the language of the Republic.[32]

In Revolutionary Russia, the identification of languages as symbolically "counter-revolutionary," and thereby "anti-Soviet," took a decade to come to the fore, while remaining cloaked by an official policy of multilingualism. The Civil War experience had convinced Lenin that the psychological legacy of "Great-Russian chauvinism" (the attitude of cultural superiority expressed by Russians towards non-Russians) had first to be overcome for national feelings to wither away.[33] The use of national languages in government, the mobility of national minority members in state and party organs, and the delineation of internal administrative borders according to a language-based nationality criteria were the three pillars of this policy known as indigenization (*korenizatsiia*).[34]

As stated above, faced with unprecedented resistance in 1932 Ukraine to the project of rural dispossession known as collectivization, Stalin concluded that Ukrainians were rebelling against Soviet power *as a consequence* of the decade-long Soviet policy of supporting the use of the Ukrainian language.[35] In this view, *korenizatsiia* had made nationality members frame their understanding of politics according to a national paradigm. The policy was terminated and the Ukrainian cultural intelligentsia decimated.[36] The ideological premise was turned on its head: policies aimed at national equality were now deemed to lead to "nationalism," stigmatized as a counter-revolutionary act and a criminal challenge to Soviet power.

The implications for the status of languages were far-reaching and remain relevant to this day. The Soviet Union did not abolish the non-Russian school and media system. Yet the use of non-Russian languages in public spheres became part of a state choreography that excluded personal initiative.[37] A poet in an official cultural event was expected to make a speech in Ukrainian, but replying in Ukrainian to a representative of state power speaking Russian could now be seen as suspicious. The shift brought about a "folklorization" of

non-Russian national identities. Ukrainian was relegated to the realms of traditional, peasant-based, cultures while the state functioned mostly in Russian.[38]

It bears mentioning that the initiator of the 2012 language law, MP Vadym Kolesnichenko, brought up this association of Ukrainian with the subversion of established order, calling his Ukrainian-speaking opponents "national fascists," on the grounds that some celebrate the memory of the movements behind the wartime Ukrainian insurgency in Western Ukraine—the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgency Army (UPA).[39] The emotions behind the overturning of the 2012 law on the fateful post-Maidan weekend, even if politically misguided, ran deep.

The second reason why languages generate political contestation is the *fluidity* of language practices, arising from the fact that language identity is *socially constructed*. Languages do not exist in a "state of nature." They evolve, in the modern era, from projects of standardization—in Gellnerian terms, the process of constituting a high culture enabling speakers to think in abstract terms[40]—that result from political choice.[41] The political recognition that a "nation" is distinct from other nations is not based on an objective criteria of language distinctness. It is rather a political claim. Making a language distinct, through standardization, becomes a means to "prove" the claim.[42]

A language identity is acquired when speakers of a language develop expectations about the use of their language in public spheres. Such expectations can arise from the first language learned, or from processes of horizontal linguistic socialization. International migrants, as a rule, seek to have their children adopt the socially dominant language of their new home. Intrastate migrants, in particular when individuals from the countryside move to the city, often follow the same pattern, as when Flemish migrants to Brussels had their children adopt French, or Ukrainian migrants to cities of eastern Ukraine adopted Russian.[43]

The social construction of languages acquires a political dimension when the language identity of individuals, and more specifically their expectations about the public use of languages, clash with the demands of state officials or civic activists. In Brussels, to the consternation of Flemish nationalists, Flemish parents insisted on, and succeeded in, maintaining the freedom to choose the language of instruction of their children, which for the great majority meant sending them to French schools and making them "Francophones," since French was perceived as the language of mobility.[44]

In the Soviet Union, the language of instruction in schools was initially determined according to the "language of origin" of children.[45] The principle was overturned by a 1958 law which granted parents the right to choose the primary language of instruction.[46] The effect was the near disappearance of Ukrainian-language schools in cities of eastern Ukraine, largely caused by a perception that Ukrainian was socially useless, since urban state institutions functioned in Russian. Language expectations became severed from the "lan-

guage of origin." A key trope in the Ukrainian nationalist narrative is that the "Russification" of these urban eastern Ukrainians has been a historical wrong that must be corrected by a state language policy that would satisfy the preferences of native speakers. As we will see, the experience of the last twenty years has shown that the growth of Ukrainian schools in eastern Ukraine has not altered the preference of eastern Ukrainians for speaking Russian.

The third driver of political contestation over the use of languages is the *asymmetry in the social status of languages*. In seeking to regulate the public use of languages, states ascribe a political status to certain languages. The language with the highest political status (variably called "state" or "official") is, in principle, the language of state symbolism, communication, and administration. Within society, however, the language perceived to be the language of socioeconomic mobility may or may not coincide with the state language. In other words, the *social* status of languages may differ from their *political* status.[47] Language laws, or the assignation of political status to languages, are passed, as a rule, with the intention of creating *incentives* for citizens to learn and speak the state language, to bring about conditions under which the state language is seen as indispensable to function in society and to make a career. In other words, legalizing the status of a language is aimed at altering the social status of languages by making a language previously seen as socially "useless" into a language of upward mobility.

This attempt at social engineering is exceedingly difficult to accomplish and inherently conflictual. A cardinal principle in the social status of languages is their asymmetry. On a given territory—a state, a region, a city—whenever two languages compete for space in public domains (defined here primarily as government institutions, but which can extend to some areas of the private sector, such as the language used at work and the language in public signs and advertisement), one language will inevitably be perceived as more socially prestigious, and therefore more "useful," than the other. The social status of languages may vary territorially within a state, as they do in Ukraine, but the point here is how these language dynamics operate within a bounded unit. As a consequence of this asymmetry, the speakers of the socially dominant language will tend to be less fluent in the other language, while the speakers of the low status language will tend to be more bilingual.

The asymmetry in social status is at the source of a persistent misunderstanding between actors during a language contestation. Speakers of the socially dominant language tend to understand official bilingualism—making two languages as state languages—as the exercise of the free choice of the language used by speakers of each linguistic community. Yet free choice can only work when both linguistic communities understand each other—in other words, when everyone is functionally bilingual—and this cannot happen without creating incentives for speakers of the high status language to learn the low

status one. If high status language speakers remain unilingual, then low status language speakers will have to switch to the high status language in order to be understood and bilingualism will in fact translate into unilingualism.

This is why the political equilibrium in language contestation has been the establishment of a single state language when the socially low status language becomes the politically high status one.[48] Thus, in order to obtain bilingualism on the ground (make speakers of a socially high status language able to communicate in the low status language), one needs unilingualism at the top (when speakers of the high status language are forced to use the low status language in their official capacity). This dynamics of language politics is conflictual both on pragmatic grounds (when the acquisition of a language is seen as a career impediment) and normative principles (when the active use of a language is seen as unnatural or uncomfortable).

The social status of languages is territorially contingent. French was low status in postwar Quebec, but high status in postwar Belgium, since the economically well-off class was speaking English in Quebec and French in Belgium. State language policies and the rise of a Dutch Belgian and Quebec French middle class have narrowed the status gap, even though the regional cultural pull of French (in Belgium) and English (in Quebec) is a constant factor. In Ukraine, Russian has been the language of urbanity, commerce, and government since the advent of modernity, while Ukrainian was associated with the countryside. Except for a brief interlude in the 1920s, Moscow-driven state policy has prevented a reversal of the trend. Since independence, language policy is now decided in Kyiv and marks the first time when a sustained effort to raise the status of Ukrainian has been undertaken. After the setback of the 2012 law and the use of language to legitimize violence and military intervention, a political compromise over language policy is back on the agenda.

The Social Landscape of Languages in Ukraine

Prior to World War II, the territory that is now Ukraine had several languages competing for public space. In Soviet Ukraine (eastern, southern, and central—roughly three-fourths of the current territory), Ukrainian was nearly hegemonic in the countryside, Russian predominated in large cities, and Yiddish was spoken by pluralities or majorities in numerous small central towns. A thick network of German-speaking agricultural colonies could also be found in the south. In the western regions of Galicia and Volhynia (under Polish rule until 1939), Polish was the language of cities, with Ukrainian and Yiddish as widespread as in central Ukraine. In two more western regions, Bukovina and Zakarpattia, then belonging to other states, Romanian and Hungarian were also dominant. Taken together, seven languages—Ukrainian, Russian,

Polish, Yiddish, German, Hungarian, and Romanian—were significant enough to matter socially.

The devastation of World War II eliminated three of them: through deportations and massacres, the overwhelming majority of Polish speakers were removed from Ukraine;[49] the Holocaust effectively annihilated Yiddish civilization in central and western Ukraine;[50] and German speakers were either evacuated (westward by German occupiers) or deported (eastward by the Soviet regime). Of the remaining four main languages, two of them (Romanian and Hungarian), spoken in provinces annexed by the Soviet Union during the war, were by then confined to small towns and villages in border areas, without a significant presence in large cities. In practice, thus, Ukraine became a territory where only two languages could compete for public space: Ukrainian and Russian.[51]

Census figures present Ukraine as an overwhelmingly biethnic state. In the most recent census (2001), nearly 95 percent of inhabitants declared themselves either of Ukrainian (77.5 percent) or Russian (17.2 percent) "nationality" (ethnicity). The only three other ethnically concentrated groups formed a combined 1.7 percent of the population (0.8 percent Romanian/Moldovan, 0.5 percent Crimean Tatar, 0.4 percent Hungarian.[52] Census data on languages, however, do not match ethnic data, since 14.8 percent of those declaring a Ukrainian ethnic nationality claim Russian as a "language of origin."[53] With nearly half of those identifying with another nationality also claiming Russian as a language of origin, the proportion of "native" speakers of Russian rises to 30 percent of the population, or 75 percent more than the number of ethnic Russians. Roughly speaking, thus, two-thirds of the population is Ukrainian-speaking and one-third Russian-speaking (with very small concentrations of Romanian/Moldovan and Hungarian speakers at the periphery), according to census data on language.

As suggested earlier in the section on the fluidity of language practices, the concept of "speaking," however, is deceptive. When people are asked in surveys to identify the language they prefer to speak in the intimacy of their home, almost half select Ukrainian and almost half, Russian (once the few percents speaking a third language are excluded).[54] This means that between one-fourth and one-third of individuals (depending on whether the option "both" is offered) who claim a Ukrainian nationality on the census actually prefer to speak Russian privately. The great majority of these Ukrainian ethnic/Russian native language speakers, called "Russified Ukrainians" in the nationalist narrative, live in eastern Ukraine.

The state, however, does not collect official language data along the criterion of preference and is unlikely to alter the category of "language of origin" in the near future.[55] This is because "language of origin" has long been understood, since the late nineteenth century and in all Soviet censuses, as a proxy

for (ethnic) nationality and nationality has become the principle legitimizing statehood. In that regard, the state is less interested in collecting evidence on language patterns than in statistically projecting a normative claim to statehood, "language of origin" being seen as the key marker of the state-building nation. The notion that language, like nationality, should denote *origins*, rather than observable behavior, has remained widespread, not just among Ukrainians who prefer to speak Ukrainian, beginning with the Ukrainian cultural elite, but also for many Ukrainians who prefer to speak Russian and yet identify with Ukrainian as their "language of origin."[56]

The controversy over the 2012 language law had initially led to demands, among those supporting making Russian a quasi-state language (a "regional" language), to have future censuses collect data on language *use*, in order to provide the Russian "language group" with a greater weight vis-à-vis the Ukrainian language group and thereby give greater legitimacy to the claim that both languages should have equal status.[57] The main objection to this demand was that the language that people use (the general criteria offered did not distinguish private and public use) is less a matter of choice than of social, economic, or political conditions and that language policy must seek to alter these conditions in order to provide individuals with real choices to exercise their language preferences.[58] For instance, if the state does not provide guidelines regarding linguistic etiquette in a citizen-civil servant interaction, and the civil servant is normatively uninclined to reply in Ukrainian when addressed in that language, then it could be said that political conditions are preventing a citizen from "using" his preferred language in public.[59]

The Demographic Weight of Languages

Anxiety over the demographic decline of a language group—the "fear of extinction"—is generally constitutive of narratives of language conflict, but statistical evidence is rarely conclusive politically.[60] In Ukraine, the census data routinely used to illustrate assimilation—the steady increase in the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians claiming Russian as a language of origin—is misleading. While we still lack a systematic study on the matter, a plausible hypothesis is that most of these "Russified Ukrainians" are, to varying degrees, of mixed (Ukrainian-Russian) lineage. That is to say, at least one ethnic Russian can be found among their parents or grandparents. The average "Russified" Ukrainian may turn out to be a Russophone Russian-Ukrainian.[61]

The significant decrease in the number of ethnic Russians in the 2001 census (a three million drop, from 22 percent to 17 percent) provided indirect evidence to that effect. The decrease was partly attributable to outmigration (mainly to Russia), but also, most likely to a significant extent, to ethnic reidentification

from Russian to Ukrainian,[62] which itself may have been significantly intergenerational; that is, children of ethnically mixed households who may have been likely to identify as Russian in the 1989 census were more likely to identify as Ukrainian in 2001. The increase in the proportion of ethnic Ukrainians claiming Russian as a language of origin between 1989 and 2001 (from 11.7 to 14.1 percent), instead of denoting greater linguistic assimilation, may be explained by the greater propensity of individuals of Russian language of origin to identify as Ukrainian under conditions of Ukrainian state independence. Identifying with the state may bring ethnically mixed people closer to a Ukrainian identity. The apparent linguistic Russification may thus mask ethnic Ukrainization (of Russian speakers).

Survey data on language of preference conducted over the last twenty years do not in fact indicate a trend towards linguistic Russification, since the proportion of the Ukrainian and Russian language groups have remained in fact relatively stable over time.[63] However, the one area where there has been significant movement in the public use of Ukrainian has been the school system. In the late 1980s, when the language question became politically salient as a result of glasnost, it was revealed that the proportion of pupils attending Ukrainian-language elementary and high schools had reached its lowest point since the creation of the Soviet Union—close to 50 percent. With the exception of western Ukraine, the vast majority of these schools were located in small towns and villages and the schools in large cities, including the capital Kyiv, were almost entirely Russian.[64]

Russian had become the language of modernity and Ukrainian, in the popular imagination, a language without a future.[65] Nearly a quarter-century later, in 2013, the proportion of pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools surged to 82 percent,[66] a proportion higher than the demographic weight of Ukrainians (78 percent in the 2001 census) and much higher than those claiming Ukrainian as a language of origin (67 percent in the 2001 census), let alone using Ukrainian as their language of preference (around 50 percent in surveys).[67] Even in overwhelmingly Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine, in terms of the de facto public language of interaction, most pupils are enrolled in Ukrainian schools, with the exception, once again, of Crimea and the urban areas of Donbas.

This remarkable transformation of the school language cartography comes with two important caveats. The first is the reliability of the data: to what extent does a school with Ukrainian as the primary language of instruction (Russian is offered as a second language, although not everywhere) actually function in Ukrainian? Media reports suggest that some subjects are still taught in Russian, and one suspects that this might be prevalent in eastern Ukraine.[68] In a post-Soviet system where informal practices resist top-down instructions, the reliance on Russian by school administrators and in extracurricular activities

is most likely still strong. Outside of western and central Ukraine, the proliferating Ukrainian-language schools may actually be far more linguistically hybrid—which is nonetheless a change to account for. The second caveat is that by all indications, an entire generation that went through the Ukrainian school system has not noticeably altered its language practices *at the informal level*. Russian-speaking children (language of preference) who go through eleven years of Ukrainian-language education still speak Russian among themselves, because Russian remains the language used outside of the classroom.[69] At this most fundamental level, the social status of Russian, as the language of "normal" interactions with one's friends (as the youth would say, as the "cool" language) has remained intact. And yet, in massively sending their children to Ukrainian schools, even the hybrid ones in eastern Ukraine, urban parents implicitly recognize that the acquisition of Ukrainian is necessary for social advancement, which points to an increase in the social status of Ukrainian, at least as the *formal* language of interaction.

The Recurring Cycle of Language Politics

It is this determination to make Ukrainian a socially useful language—in the Ukrainian/Russian idiom, to make it acquire long-term prospect (*perspektivnyi*, Ukrainian having become *bezperspektivnyi* in the Soviet era)—that inspired the passing of a language law in the autumn of 1989, when Ukraine was still part of the Soviet Union.[70] The law proclaimed Ukrainian as the state language (*derzhavna mova*), while remaining vague on the status of Russian. For Ukrainian-language activists, the symbolism of making Ukrainian a state language was meant to send the message that Ukrainian would now become necessary to make a career (there was no private sector at the time). Opponents, meanwhile, clung to the preposterous notion that the "development of Ukrainian" would have no incidence on existing language practices, and that Russian speakers would not have to start using Ukrainian in formal interactions.

Mimicking demands formulated in other Soviet republics, they demanded, unsuccessfully, that Russian be recognized as a "language of interethnic communication" (*iazyk mezhnatsional´nykh otnoshenii*), a transposition of the pan-Soviet truism that Russian was the only language common to members of all nationalities across the Soviet Union. The point of making Ukrainian a state language, however, was to make Ukrainian, not Russian, the language of official interaction in Ukraine itself. Opponents succeeded in inserting a clause about the "inalienable" right of the freedom to choose the language of instruction of one's children, but this was counterbalanced by another article indicating that mandatory testing for students applying to a higher educational

institution would now be in Ukrainian. The law contained no enforcement mechanism, crucially regarding the fate of civil servants failing to show fluency in Ukrainian, and set up no monitoring agency, but the testing clause in itself was an important step towards making Ukrainian a socially useful language.

The language law had three major effects. First, Ukrainian became the language of the highest state functions, such as in public ceremonies featuring government officials, or in parliament, where the debates were increasingly conducted in Ukrainian. Second, as mentioned earlier, the proportion of students enrolled in schools with Ukrainian as the primary language of instruction rose steadily, dramatically in the case of Kyiv, and a prestigious new private university, the Mohyla Academy, offered courses in Ukrainian (and English) only. Third, Ukrainian became the language of written communication (*dilovodstvo*) in state institutions. Orally, however, most civil servants continued to use Russian. Moreover, the proliferating private media outlets (TV and radio stations, newspapers, magazines) massively favored the use of Russian.[71]

When Ukraine held its first post-Soviet parliamentary elections in March 1994, the language question was put on the agenda. A loose coalition of Communist and independent candidates from Russian-speaking eastern provinces, called the "Inter-Regional Group," demanded that Russian be recognized as a second state language and city councils in Donetsk and elsewhere passed resolutions to that effect.

Four months later, during the presidential election, former Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma, the main challenger to incumbent President Leonid Kravchuk, co-opted these demands. In his inaugural address, following an unexpected victory, Kuchma announced that he would initiate legislation to make Russian an "official" language. This created a storm among the Ukrainian cultural elite and experts from the Academy of Sciences correctly argued that there was no difference in world practice between a "state" language and an "official" language.[72] Kuchma was also determined to pass an economic reform package and he quickly realized that he needed the support of deputies from western Ukraine opposed to his language initiative. As a result, the promise of elevating the official status of Russian was dropped. This created a pattern that would be repeated over two decades: during an electoral season, similar promises would invariably be made by candidates and political parties vying for support in eastern Ukraine, but the language law would then remain unchanged—until the pattern was broken by the 2012 language law.

There were three attempts to reopen the language question by means others than legislation. The first was the adoption of the Constitution in 1996. For more than four years, Ukraine had been ruled by an obsolete and heavily amended Soviet Constitution and Kuchma threatened to bypass parliament to have a new constitution adopted by referendum if parliament was unable to adopt one. The three political stumbling blocs all had to do with identity:

the status of languages, state symbols, and the status of Crimea. Under the pressure of an all-night session, a compromise was found: on the one hand, Crimea, the only province with a majority of ethnic Russians, kept its status as an "Autonomous Republic"; on the other, Ukrainian, in article 10, remained the sole state language, but without granting any particular status to Russian. Even the idea that Russian could be used in "sites of compact settlement"—the precursor of "regional language"—was rejected. A vague formulation "guaranteed" the use of Russian, but without specifying what this meant in practice.[73]

The second attempt was a legal interpretation in 2001 of the constitutional clause on the use of languages. Asked by a group of Ukrainian nationalist deputies to "clarify" the meaning of article 10 of the 1996 Constitution, the Constitutional Court had nothing specific to say about the status of Russian, except that it "can be used within the limits and order designated by the laws of Ukraine," a clarification not yet provided in Ukrainian law. The status of Ukrainian, on the other hand, was seen as unambiguous by the court: the state language "must be understood to mean that Ukrainian…is the obligatory language of communication on all the territory of Ukraine in the exercise of authority by the organs of state power." In the court's view, the "guaranteed" right to use Russian, the key element of the 1996 compromise for Russian-language activists, had no substantive meaning in the Constitution and was contingent upon legislative initiative.[74]

The third attempt, which culminated in the 2012 language law, was a disingenuous interpretation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. For nearly fifty years, the protection of ethnic or language minorities remained in abeyance in European institutions, following the catastrophe of the 1930s and World War II, when the "principle of nationality" was invoked by states (Germany, the Soviet Union) and far-right movements to justify war and mass violence. The rise of the nationality question in the collapsing Communist bloc, the Yugoslav wars, and the prospects of European integration for formerly Communist states or "republics" (nine have since joined the EU) made ethnic and linguistic questions once again politically salient at the European level. The Council of Europe and the OSCE began to monitor controversial "minority" issues.

A key normative document adopted by the Council of Europe was the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The charter invoked principles of ecology (the protection of endangered languages as cultural "capital") and individual rights (the "inalienable" right to use regional or minority languages in "private and public life") to codify the use of these languages in territories ("districts"), notably in public administration and education, "in which the number of…users…justifies the measures."[75]

Linking the use of minority languages in public spheres to certain territories is a seriously contested proposition in Europe. France is philosophically

opposed to the very notion of minority rights, to the idea that an intermediate group—defined according to an ethnic, religious, language, social, or regional criterion—stands between the citizen and the state. Belgium is constitutionally divided into officially unilingual territories (Flanders and Wallonia) with the exception of the capital, where speakers of minority languages (French in Flanders, Dutch in Wallonia) have no right of public use. States seeking accession into European institutions were thus asked to abide by principles that divide established Western European states.

In all the states affected by the charter, the Ukrainian case is unique in that, as shown earlier, the language of the main ethnic minority (Russian) is the language of preference of as many people as those speaking the state language (Ukrainian). Nevertheless, the Ukrainian parliament quietly ratified the charter in 1999, with limited public debates, using a threshold of 20 percent to identify the territories where minority languages could be used ("in which the number… justifies the measures").[76] It did not seem to dawn on Ukrainian-language supporters that applying the charter to Russian could mean providing a legal status to Russian in a huge part of the country. The ratification was later overturned by the Constitutional Court on a technicality, arguably when the scope of the charter became clear, and a new version was reintroduced raising the threshold to 50 percent, in accord with the 1989 language law which limited the public use of other languages to areas where members of a nationality constitutes a majority (which in effect would only allow Russian to be used in Crimea).

The charter was finally ratified in 2005 under President Yushchenko, with the 50 percent threshold and with government officials arguing that the charter applied only to "dying languages" and not to socially dominant languages such as Russian. Admittedly, the European authors of the charter did not anticipate that a language preferentially spoken by half of the population of a state could fall under its purview. And yet their intentions went beyond the symbolic affirmation of disappearing languages, since the fate of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia preoccupied European organizations at the time.

The Search for a Political Consensus

Government policy after the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010 challenged for the first time the equilibrium established in 1989: one state language, no particular status for Russian, yet maintenance of Russian as the predominant oral languages in cities—except in select circles of high culture and high politics, and in western Ukraine. Yanukovych, like Kuchma, hailed from eastern Ukraine. Unlike Kuchma, however, he headed a party with near hegemonic control in eastern Ukraine, the Party of Regions. In addition, as a result of decisions by the Constitutional Court that were inconsistent with

previous rulings, Yanukovych could count on a stable majority in parliament to support his policies, enabling him to bypass the opposition which was almost exclusively based in central and western Ukraine. Whereas Kuchma needed pro-Ukrainian language forces to push through his political program, Yanukovych did not.

Emboldened, the Party of Regions tabled a draft law euphemistically called "On the Principles of State Language Policy," since the main point of the law was to establish Russian as a "regional" language. The authors of the draft were openly in favor of establishing Russian as a second state language, but knew that they could not muster a constitutional majority to overturn the relevant constitutional article. A new language law, requiring a simple majority and based on the already ratified European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, became the means to implicitly make Russian a second state language (or almost). The law constantly referred to "regional languages," and rarely to Russian as such, but everyone knew that it was intended to apply to the language dominating all regional centers outside of western Ukraine, not languages spoken by less than 2 percent of the population, and of significance in only one or two small border towns.

The 2012 law overturned three core principles of the 1989 law. First, by using an ethnic threshold of 10 percent in territories as small as an urban district, it ensured that Russian would effectively function as a "regional" language almost everywhere in eastern Ukraine.[77] Second, in these areas meeting the threshold (all cities of eastern Ukraine), the law allowed the language of written documentation both within the region and in communications between regional and state organs, to be in Russian only ("in the state language *or* in the regional language"). The 1989 law had ruled that only Ukrainian could be used in either case (except in Crimea). Third, the law reiterated the "inalienable" right of parents to choose the language of instruction for their children, but added clauses granting parents, whenever in sufficient numbers, the right to have authorities open classes in a language of instruction different from the language of the school. Since the great majority of schools had transferred to Ukrainian in the last twenty years, the intent was to transform many Ukrainian schools into partly Russian ones.[78]

The 2012 law has been criticized for subverting the spirit of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which was indeed not devised for socially dominant languages such as Russian. The Council of Europe rapporteurs and the Venice Commission, which provides legal opinions of draft legislations on behalf of the council, were indeed fairly critical of the draft laws submitted for evaluation, but they did not, and could not, call into question the legality of using the charter to make Russian a regional language, since Russian is the language of a demographic minority of ethnic Russians in Ukraine. The main objection of the European monitors was that the law had the effect of

promoting the use of the regional language (Russian) *at the expense* of the state language (Ukrainian).[79] OSCE High Commissionner Kurt Vollebaek touched a raw nerve when he wrote that "there is no right of persons belonging to national minorities never to be expected to use the State language."[80] The 2012 law was indeed structured to give Russian the widest possible public space, without creating incentives for the use of Ukrainian.

This is the law that the Ukrainian parliament repealed in February 2014, a day after the constitutional vote to depose President Yanukovych. The repeal, however, was by a simple majority, with few votes from eastern Ukrainian MPs (a majority of whom had voted the day before to remove Yanukovych), and caused such an outcry that Interim President Turchynov refused to sign it into law a week later. The wildest interpretations were given to the repeal—that Russian was to be banned, that the physical security of Russian speakers was at stake—a radical discourse used to justify the annexation of Crimea and the armed insurgency/Russian military intervention in Donbas. These assertions were ludicrous, but the notion that a consensual language policy in Ukraine was contingent upon providing legal status to Russian was not. The problem with the 2012 law was not that it gave "regional" status to Russian, but the fact that it was defined in ways that contradicted the constitutional status of Ukrainian as the "state language." In his inaugural address on May 2014, President Petro Poroshenko, in "guaranteeing the free use of Russian," merely repeated article 10 of the 1996 Constitution, the same formulation that could not be clarified by the Constitutional Court in 1999. The time is now ripe for a legal clarification of the public use of Russian.

Towards Symmetrical Bilingualism

What are the options? In polities where two languages compete for public space, the core principle is official territorial unilingualism. Canada is a bilingual country, but French is the only official language in Quebec.[81] The message sent by the Quebec government was that French is necessary to make a career in Quebec, a message understood by Anglophone parents, since the overwhelming majority either send their children to an immersion program within the English school system, or to French schools. Belgium is a bilingual country, but Dutch is the only official language in Flanders and Francophones cannot be served in French on Flemish territory. Belgian federal ministries are divided into Dutch-speaking and French-speaking units, making Dutch the language of mobility.

The relevant analogy to Ukraine is to have Ukrainian as the sole official language at the center in order to make Ukrainian the language of mobility. What French in Quebec, Dutch in Flanders, and Ukrainian in Ukraine have in

common is that they are all competing with socially more powerful languages in their public spaces and require state regulation to make their national language a language of mobility. A language becomes socially useful the more it portends success in moving up the social ladder. Keeping the college entrance examinations in Ukrainian is axiomatic in that regard. Developing state-funded programs supporting Ukrainian-language elite schools, book publishing, culture, and media, which is common practice in Canada and Europe, are also steps to increase the social prestige of Ukrainian. A policy that allows the parallel use of Russian as a substitute for Ukrainian at all levels of public life, as was the case in the 2012 law, has the effect of making Russian, not Ukrainian, the language of mobility.

The real bone of contention is in clarifying the parameters of Russian language public use in eastern Ukraine. It has become fairly clear by now that Russian speakers in the east will not "de-Russify," in the sense of transferring to Ukrainian as their language of preference. As pointed out earlier, surveys in the past twenty years have shown that the overall proportion of Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers has remained fairly constant. Moreover, we now know that in the dramatic conditions of political violence, the Russian language has been decoupled from state loyalty. To be sure, pro-Russia demonstrators and insurgents use the language question as one of their grievances, but the people they are fighting, whether in Odesa, Kharkiv, or even Donbas, are also Russian speakers, who are risking their security to defend the state. The upshot is that the vast predominance of Russian speakers—individuals who prefer to use Russian in public spaces—is a deep-rooted demographic fact in urban areas of the east and south that is fundamentally part of Ukrainian identity and of an identification with the Ukrainian state, rather than a subversion of it.

Using Russian in public spaces means the ability to work in Russian and to interact in Russian with representatives of state power. This has always been the practice in the east, of course, but the absence of status and regulations for Russian meant that the possibility, in people's perceptions, that one day bureaucrats from Kyiv would come down and demand a switch to Ukrainian, was also present—however impractical, if not absurd, such a policy would be, since regional administrations lack a critical mass of Ukrainian speakers.[82] To achieve a political equilibrium over languages, Kyiv will have to concede that the intra-regional language of mobility within the east and south is Russian, that is to say, that Ukrainian is not required, unless one has to communicate with the center, or wish to make a career in Kyiv. This would give tangible meaning to the status of "regional" language. The model would thus be unilingual Ukrainian at the center, unilingual Russian in the east, unilingual Ukrainian in the west.

From a normative perspective, the greatest challenge is the fate of linguistic minorities in the regions, namely Ukrainian speakers in the east and Russian speakers in the west. Inasmuch as the state seeks to make Ukrainian the lan-

guage of mobility towards the center, the development of a Ukrainian-language school system in the east is a prerequisite and, due to the social predominance of Russian, state incentives to enroll in Russian classes are counterproductive. The real issue is the ability to be served in Ukrainian by civil servants, a rare practice in the east. A valid claim is that the people who really need language protection in the east are the Ukrainian speakers, since they have little opportunity to use their language in formal interactions.

Yet requiring civil servants to abide by the linguistic choice of their customers amounts to making Ukrainian a language of mobility within the region, and this is exactly the result Russian speakers reject. The likelihood that such a policy could be enforced is, in any case, remote in the context of low legal culture in Ukraine, and with a political culture inimical to the mirror delivery of Russian-language services in western Ukraine. The stepping stone of a political consensus over language is the recognition that regional administrations in the east operate in Russian (but not when they communicate with the center). To be sure, any law that appears to gives legal standing to the predominant, often exclusive use, of Russian in urban institutions will be decried by language activists and Ukrainian nationalists who see Russian as a threat to Ukrainian identity and the Ukrainian state.

The argument, to be tested in the evolving Ukrainian political dynamics, is that the war with Russia has put to rest the notion that a Russian-speaking east and south is a problem for the unity and robustness of the Ukrainian state.[83] Electoral imperatives have long eluded a compromise over language: Kuchma needed western Ukrainian support more than keeping his promises to an eastern electorate, Yushchenko governed without the support of eastern Ukrainians, and Yanukovych governed without the support of western Ukrainians. A post-Maidan Ukrainian government could have the votes to pass a new language law without the support of eastern Ukrainians,[84] but this would run counter to the lessening of regional cleavages observed since the fall of Yanukovych and the war in Donbas. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, for the first time in post-Soviet Ukraine, a single party—that of President Poroshenko—was able to obtain pluralities or majorities in all regions of Ukraine, doing away with electoral regional polarization. The stakes were unique—Ukraine's territorial integrity—and are unlikely to last,[85] but could change the electoral calculus towards seeking compromises with the eastern Ukrainian electorate in order to keep a pan-regional support.

A compromise over language is to unambiguously make Russian a language of mobility in eastern Ukraine and make Ukrainian a language of mobility at the center. This will clarify that Russian speakers have to use Ukrainian to make a career at the national level, but that they will not be disadvantaged in their own town or region by having to use Ukrainian at work. Informal language practices have already been pointing in that direction for years, but Donbas officials, who

captured national politics under Yanukovych, were opposed. The compromise would give substance to the status of "regional language": not Russian at the expense of Ukrainian, but Russian at one level, and Ukrainian at another.

Notes

1. The presidential election of 1994 and all presidential and parliamentary contests between 2004 and 2012 have produced a regional polarization of the vote along an eastern-western axis. Statistical analyses of surveys have shown that the "Russian" question—language status and relations with Russia—was the primary factor causing the polarization. See Dominique Arel, "La face cachée de la Révolution orange: l'Ukraine et le déni de son problème régional," *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* (Paris) 37, no. 4 (décembre 2006): 11–48. Language controversies took place against this backdrop of long-term structural divisions. The 1999 presidential election was not polarized because the government prevented the candidate preferred in western Ukraine from making it to the final round. Parliamentary elections became polarized once a proportional representation (PR) system was introduced in 2003.
2. In his "victory speech" announcing the annexation of Crimea to Russia, President Putin brought up the "scandalous" overturning of the 2012 language law as a security threat to Crimean Russian speakers (President of Russia, "Address by President of the Russian Federation," 18 March 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889). Pro-Russia armed combatants in Donbas have repeatedly asserted that the February 2014 repeal of the language law was "a turning point," a "cultural assault" in their determination to take up arms (C. J. Chivers and Noah Sneider, "Behind the Masks in Ukraine, Many Faces of Rebellion," *New York Times*, 3 May 2014). Russian citizen Igor Girkin (Strelkov), who commanded the combatants of the "Donetsk People's Republic" (DNR) between April and August 2014, said that one of the reasons he became involved was to protect "the right to speak Russian" (Igor Strelkov, "Obrashchenie Igoria Strelkova, *Youtube*, 17 May 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0jBHkknIXsg).
3. What is cyclical is the recurrence of language becoming politically or electorally salient, not resorting to violence in the name of language grievances.
4. For a comprehensive portrait of the use of Ukrainian and Russian in various public domains, see Julianne Besters-Dilger, *Language Policy and Language Situation in Ukraine: Analysis and Recommendations* (Frankfurt, 2009), and Vseukraïns´kyi komitet zakhystu ukraïns´koï movy, *Stanovyshche ukraïns´koï movy v Ukraïni u 2014–15 rokakh: Analitychnyi ohliad*, 8 July 2015, http://movaua.org.ua/?p=1496.
5. Such as claiming that Kyiv was perpetrating a "genocide of Russian speakers": Halya Coynash, "Russia Accuses Ukraine of Committing 'Genocide of Russian Speakers,'" *Prava liudyny v Ukraïni*, 1 October 2014, http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1412115043.

6. As of late 2016, the post-Maidan Ukrainian government had not yet tabled a new draft law on languages. Control over security forces and over the border between Donbas and Russia is the main impediment to a political settlement in Donbas.
7. As a shorthand, unless specified otherwise, central and western Ukrainians will be heretofore referred to as "western" Ukrainians, while "eastern" will stand for eastern and southern Ukrainians. As will become clear later, "speaking Ukrainian (Russian)" is also a shorthand, for "who prefer to speak Ukrainian (Russian)." Among the significant exceptions to this tripartite division: Kyiv, in central Ukraine, being mainly ethnic Ukrainian but Russian-speaking; "Ukrainian-speaking" or "Russian-speaking" denoting a *preference* to use one language over another, not an incapacity to use the other, as most are bilingual in various degrees; and the presence of Ukrainian-speaking minorities in the east and of Russian-speaking minorities in the west.
8. Mykola Skrypnyk, the architect of linguistic *korenizatsiia* and Minister of Education between 1926 and 1932, even developed a theory about Russian-speaking Ukrainians returning to their Ukrainian "native" language. See Matthew D. Pauly, *Breaking the Tongue: Language, Education, and Power in Soviet Ukraine, 1923–1934* (Toronto, 2014), 28, 155. The oft-repeated contemporary claims that Ukrainian "nation-building" has remained "incomplete" implicitly point to the "re-Ukrainization" of eastern Ukrainians as a natural process. See, for instance, Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine: A Four-Pronged Transition," in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, ed. Taras Kuzio (Armonk, N.Y., 1998), 165–80.
9. In Zhurzhenko's apt formulation, eastern Ukrainians do not consider themselves "just [as] victims of an imposed external power but also [as] active agents of their own history": Tatyana Zhurzhenko, "The Myths of Two Ukraines," *Eurozine*, 19 September 2002, http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2002-09-17-zhurzhenko-en.html.
10. Dominique Arel and Valerii Khmel´ko, "Regional Divisions in the 2004 Presidential Elections: The Role of Language and Ethnicity," Danyliw Research Seminar in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 2005.
11. On the rise of Russian nationalist movements in Ukraine in the wake of Maidan, see Oleksandr Mel´nyk, "The Turmoil in Eastern Ukraine," presented at the roundtable "Ukraine under Russian Threat," Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa. Posted on the Ukraine List (UKL) no. 469, 14 March 2014.
12. David M. Herszenhorn, "Away from Show of Diplomacy in Geneva, Putin Puts on a Show of His Own," New York Times, 17 April 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/world/europe/russia-ukraine.html.
13. In a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in February 2014, just prior to the deadly violence that erupted on Maidan on 18–20 February, western and central Ukrainians supported the Maidan demonstrators in proportions of 80 percent vs. 3 percent and 51 percent vs. 11 percent, compared

to 20 percent vs. 32 percent in the south and 8 percent vs. 51 percent in the east. "Stavlennia v Ukraïni ta Rossiï do aktsii protestu v Ukraïni," Pres-relizy ta zvity, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 28 February 2014, http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=231&page=5.

14. Paul Chaisty and Stephen Whitefield, "Support for Separatism in Southern and Eastern Ukraine is Lower than You Think," 6 February 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/02/06/support-for-separatism-in-southern-and-eastern-ukraine-is-lower-than-you-think/; Program for Public Consultation,"The Ukrainian People on the Current Crisis," School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, 9 March 2015, http://cissm.umd.edu/publications/ukrainian-people-current-crisis; Henry E. Hale, "Insurgency, Political Violence, and Russia in the Eyes of Ukraine's Masses," paper presented at the PONARS Eurasia Workshop, "Analyzing Violence in Ukraine," George Washington University, 2015.
15. According to the site *Knyha pam'iati polehlykh za Ukraïnu*, which provides biographical information on the more than 3,000 soldiers from Ukraine who perished in the war, 27 percent of those born in Ukraine came from the six southern oblasts fully controlled by Ukraine (thus excluding Donbas, Luhansk, and Crimea). In 2012, 35 percent of the population lived in these oblasts. While the two figures are not immediately comparable, since the demographic trends between a general population and an army cohort are not identical, they still provide a general picture. Calculated from http://memorybook.org.ua/index.htm, as of October 2016.
16. At least a third of individuals killed during Maidan, and whose regional provenance could be established, were from the three Galician provinces of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk, while 12 percent of soldiers who perished in Donbas were from Galicia, three oblasts which formed 11 percent of the state population in 2012. See "List of People Killed during Euromaidan," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_people_killed_during_Euromaidan, and *Knyha pam'iati*, http://memorybook.org.ua/index.htm.
17. Mykola Riabtchouk [Riabchuk], *De la "Petite-Russie" à l'Ukraine* (Paris, 2003).
18. In a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in April 2014, just after the annexation of Crimea, one-fourth of residents in Donetsk (25.5 percent) and Luhansk (25.1 percent) were in favor of the annexation (*prisoedinenie*) of their region to Russia, ten points higher than in Kharkiv (14.9 percent), and more than three times higher than in the regions of eastern and southern Ukraine, where support ranged from 2.7 percent to 7.2 percent. In other words, even though Russian is the predominant language of preference in all of eastern and southern Ukraine, there was significant variation on the question of state loyalty. See "Dumky ta Pohliady Zhyteliv Pivdenno-Skhidnykh Oblastei Ukraïny: Kviten´ 2014," 20 April 2014, http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=302&page=3.
19. Faith Hillis, *Children of Rus´: Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation* (Chicago, 2013).

20. Andrea Graziosi, ed. *Lettres de Kharkov: La famine en Ukraine 1932–1933* (Lausanne, 2013).
21. President of Russia, "Address."
22. Office québécois de la langue française, "The Charter of the French Language," 2002, http://www.oqlf.gouv.qc.ca/english/charter/. In official discourse, "people" (peuple) is used as a synonym of "nation." Since 1968, the year when the pro-independence Parti Québécois was created, the Quebec provincial parliament has been known as the National Assembly, as in France. A 2006 resolution of the House of Commons, the federal parliament, recognized Quebec as a "nation." See the article by François Charbonneau in this volume on language politics in Quebec and Canada.
23. Kataryna Wolczuk, *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation* (Budapest, 2001), 87–90.
24. "Constitution of Ukraine (2004, amended 2016) (English version)," *Legislation Online*, http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions. For the Ukrainian orginal see http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254к/96-вр. In this convoluted view, the Ukrainians are a "nation" (*natsiia*), but their self-determination is exercised by both the nation and the "people" (*narod*), comprised of citizens of all "nationalities" (*natsional´nist´* in the singular form, understood as ethnic affiliation).
25. Primordialist assumptions undergird the belief that the nation originated "from time immemorial," that ancestors were conscious of their ethnocultural distinctiveness and settled first on what became the national territory. This is standard fare among mainstream (Rukh in the 1990s, Our Ukraine in the 2000s) or radical (Svoboda in the 2010s) Ukrainian nationalist groups or, for that matter, to most nationalist movements in the world.
26. In the 2010 presidential runoff, Viktor Yanukovych, the candidate of the Party of Regions, received 90 percent of the vote in Donbas. He won the election nationally with a score of 49 percent. In the 2012 one-round parliamentary election, the combined score in favor of the Party or Regions and of its small-sized satellite party, the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), varied between 80 and 90 percent across the Donbas electoral districts. Data are available on the website of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.gov.ua. Most top government officials in Kyiv under President Yanukovych were from Donbas.
27. The 2014 war in Donbas has, however, pointed to potentially important variations within the Donbas region regarding Ukrainian state support, between the territories controlled by pro-Russian forces (the extended urbanized areas between the regional centers of Donetsk and Luhansk) and those under Ukrainian state control (the coastal city of Mariupol, outside of the geographic, but not administrative, "Donbas," as well as smaller towns and villages in southern Donetsk and northern Luhansk). Scholars have claimed that pro-Russian forces have failed to capture some of these areas precisely when there was a pushback locally (see Serhiy Kude-

lia, "The Donbas Insurgency: Origins, Organization and the Dynamics of Violence," paper presented at the Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine, University of Ottawa, 2014). Such intra-Donbas variation, or more specifically intra-Donetsk oblast and intra-Luhansk oblast variation, could not be tapped in pre-2014 surveys where sampling was done at the level of the oblast.

28. In response to the question "If there was such a choice, would you support the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine today?" 21 percent said "mostly not" and 36 percent "definitely not." Sotsiolohichna hrupa "Rating," "Dynamika patriotychnykh nastroïv," August 2013, http://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/dinamika_patrioticheskih_nastroeniy.html. Although the survey did not provide an intra-Donbas variation, the proportion of "not" was likely higher in the urban areas around the two regional capitals of Donetsk and Luhansk, which have lain outside the control of the central state since spring 2014. Northern Donbas, around the city of Mariupol, and rural areas likely showed greater support for Ukraine.
29. The question was "Do you support or not the view that your oblast should separate (*otdelit´sia*) from Ukraine and unite (*prisoedinitsia*) with Russia?": 11.9 percent "absolutely" supported and 15.6 percent "mostly" supported in Donetsk, compared to 13.2 percent and 17.1 percent in Luhansk. The scores were almost twice as high as the average in the other six eastern and southern oblasts. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, "Dumky ta pohliady zhiteliv Pivdenno-Skhidnykh oblastei Ukraïny: kviten´ 2014," 20 April 2014, http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=302&page=3.
30. According to a poll conducted on the eve of the May 2014 presidential election, most residents in other provinces of the east and south were split between having Russian as a "regional" or "state" language. Donbas was the only region where a huge majority (74 percent) was in favor of Russian as a state language. Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, conducted with Sotsis and Rating, "Ukraïna na peredodni prezydent´skykh vyboriv," 21 May 2014, http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=news&id=317&page=1.
31. Volodymyr Kulyk, "Constructing Common Sense: Language and Ethnicity in Ukrainian Political Discourse," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 2 (March 2006): 281–314.
32. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernisation of Rural France* (Berkeley, Calif., 1976). The controversies over the integration of immigrants in Europe also calls into question the alleged neutrality of languages. In several states experiencing a retrenchment of the policy of "multiculturalism," such as the Netherlands, the obligation to learn the state language now figures prominently among the prerequisites to obtain citizenship. See Christian Joppke, "The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy," *British Journal of Sociology* 55, no. 2 (June 2004): 237–57. The issue goes far beyond the pragmatics of communication, pertaining to the identity of the state. Even when bereft of the standard ethnonational narrative, a politically dominant language cannot be

divorced from core cultural components (symbols, historical memory) which, in the last analysis, serve the function of legitiziming the state in the first place. Language acts as a medium of shared experiences. See Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Cambridge, 1995).

33. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton, N.J., 1984).
34. Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2001).
35. Terry Martin, "The 1932–33 Ukrainian Terror: New Documentation on Surveillance and the Thought Process of Stalin," in *Famine-Genocide in Ukraine 1932–1933: Western Archives, Testimonies and New Research*, ed. Wsewolod W. Isajiw (Toronto, 2003), 97–114.
36. James Mace, *Communism and the Dilemma of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
37. Dominique Arel, "Interpreting 'Nationality' and 'Language' in the 2001 Ukrainian Census," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 18, no. 3 (July–September 2002): 213–49.
38. Post-Soviet Belarus has preserved this system to the closest extent, which explains why President Lukashenka can use Belarusian in official visits abroad and have demonstrators at home arrested for speaking Belarusian.
39. In his speech defending his draft language law in May 2012, Kolesnichenko stated that "You can hear the coven organized by the national-fascists who do not accept any other point of view except their own. These are national-fascists who are able to shoot a human being because he speaks a different language and not the one they would like him to speak." Cited in Michael Moser, *Language Policy and the Discourse on Languages in Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych (25 February 2010–28 October 2012)* (Stuttgart, 2013), 335.
40. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1983).
41. David D. Laitin, *Politics, Language and Thought: The Somali Experience* (Chicago, 1977).
42. The reverse is true. The claim that a language is "not" distinct arises from the belief that a group claiming to be a nation is not a nation. The oft-repeated assertion by President Putin that Ukraine "is not a nation" is based on a long-standing predisposition in Russia to see Ukrainian "separatism" as a threat to Russian state integrity. The companion view calling Ukrainian a "dialect" is reinforcing, rather than causing this rejection of the idea of Ukrainian political self-determination. On Putin's claim, see Jason Fields, "In Putin's Mind, Ukraine is Not a Nation," *Reuters*, 14 October 2014, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/10/14/in-putins-mind-ukraine-is-not-a-nation/.
43. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cities of Eastern Europe tended to linguistically assimilate rural migrants into either German, Polish, or Russian. Yiddish was also a predominant urban language, but never served as a language of administration.

44. A 1930 political compromise eliminated this freedom of choice in Flanders and Wallonia. In 1965 the attempt by Flemish nationalists to extend the ban to Brussels failed under the gendered principle of "la liberté du père de famille" (the father's freedom). See Dominique Arel, "Political Stability in Multinational Democracies: Comparing Language Dynamics in Brussels, Montreal and Barcelona," in *Multinational Democracies*, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully (Cambridge, 2001), 80. In Quebec, nationalists in power effectively prevented Québécois Francophone parents from exercising this choice, as a byproduct of a policy aimed at sending immigrant children to French schools. See Marc Levine, *The Reconquest of Montreal: Language Policy and Social Change in a Bilingual City* (Philadelphia, 1990). The criteria used for eligibility into an English school was one of the parents having studied in English in Canada, which disqualified international migrants, but also the vast majority of Francophones, since their parents, in traditional Quebec, went to French Catholic schools.
45. *Ridna mova* (Ukrainian)/*rodnoi iazyk* (Russian) is usually rendered as "native language" or "mother tongue." A more accurate translation is "language of origin." See Dominique Arel, "Language Categories in Censuses: Backward- or Forward-Looking?" in *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses*, ed. David I. Kertzer and Dominique Arel (Cambridge, 2002), 92–120.
46. Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958–1959 and Soviet Nationality Policy," *Soviet Studies* 14, no. 2 (1962): 138–57. A major exception to the pre-1958 "language of origin" rule was the decision by Soviet party officials in the 1920s to prevent *korenizatsiia* leaders from having working-class Russian-speaking Ukrainians transferred to Ukrainian schools. Urban Ukrainian schools were meant for Ukrainian-speaking peasants migrating to the cities, not for those from the core and expanding industrial working-class. Pauly, *Breaking the Tongue*, 211.
47. Kathryn Woolard, *Double Talk* (Stanford, Calif., 1985); David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Population in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1998).
48. Jean Laponce, *Loi de Babel et autres régularités des rapports entre language et politique* (Quebec, 2006).
49. Catherine Gousseff, *Échanger les peuples: Le déplacement des minorités aux confins polono- soviétiques (1944–1947)* (Paris, 2015).
50. Ray Brandon and Wendy Lower, eds., *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization* (Bloomington, Ind., 2008).
51. The transfer of the province of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 and the return from deportation of Crimean Tatars in the 1990s added a third language, but, as a legacy of decades in exile, few of the returnees actively speak Crimean Tatar and language demands have been less salient than ethnic ones.
52. All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "National Composition of the Population," 2003, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/.

53. All-Ukrainian Population Census 2001, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, "Linguistic Composition of the Population," 2003, http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/language/.
54. A 2004 survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology had 47.1 percent of respondents indicating Russian as their preferred language for the interview, 39.6 percent Ukrainian and 13.4 percent either, suggesting that some Ukrainian was used in the homes of slightly more than half of the population (Arel and Khmel´ko, "Regional Divisions").
55. Strictly speaking, data on language of preference cannot be collected during a census, since the latter is not based on observable behavior, but on claimed behavior, which often differs. Following KIIS's practice, however, the state could make census forms available in either Ukrainian or Russian and then compile statistics on how many choose the Ukrainian or Russian forms.
56. Census data on "language of origin," (generally translated as "native language, as we saw) however, has its usefulness. In a study based on focus groups, Kulyk reports that "the respondents' native language influenced their language-related attitudes and policy preferences more strongly than the language of everyday use." Volodymyr Kulyk, "Language Policy in Ukraine: What People Want the State to Do," *East European Politics & Societies* 27, no. 2 (2013): 280–307, here 286.
57. Moser, *Language Policy*, 268.
58. Ibid., 277. The debate over the criteria of "language use" is reminiscent of the demands formulated by Czech nationalists in Habsburg Bohemia at the turn of the twentieth century. Nationalists objected to the category of "language of use" (*Umgangsprache*) on the Austro-Hungarian census on the grounds that many Czech speakers had to use German at work out of necessity, which inflated the number of German speakers. Arel, "Language Categories in Censuses," 92–120.
59. Kulyk has found very little awareness among his respondents that civil servants should respond in the language used by citizens. Kulyk, "Language Policy in Ukraine."
60. In Quebec, where the politically charged issue is whether children of immigrants will assimilate to the French-speaking or English-speaking group, despite long-standing census evidence that two immigrants out of three transfer to French, and that more English speakers leave Quebec than French speakers, resulting in a statistically stable proportion of French speakers (upwards of 80%), a constant staple of the nationalist narrative is that Quebec is "anglicizing."
61. Arel and Khmel´ko, "Regional Divisions."
62. Ihor Stebelsky, "Ethnic Self-Identification in Ukraine, 1989–2001: Why More Ukrainians and Fewer Russians?" *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 51, no. 1 (March 2009): 77–100.
63. Data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Of course, from the standpoint of the remedial nation-building narrative, the absence of a reverse trend of linguistic Ukrainization—the fact that millions of self-declared ethnic

Ukrainians continue to prefer to speak Russian—is seen as a failure of Ukrainian language policy.

64. Dominique Arel, "The Temptation of the Nationalizing State," in *Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Armonk, N.Y., 1995), 157–88.
65. Not quite, as it turned out, since an urban Ukrainian-language school system was developed in western Ukraine and western Ukrainians became disproportionately represented in the Ukrainian nationalist movement.
66. Vseukraïns´kyi komitet zakhystu ukraïns´koï movy, "Stanovyshche ukraïns´koï movy."
67. In fall 2014, after Ukraine lost control of Crimea and of core urban areas of Donbas, the proportion of children in Ukrainian schools in areas where central statistics could be generated rose noticeably to 89.4 percent. In 2013, only 3 percent of Crimean children studied in Ukrainian. In Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk), while the proportion was a little under 50 percent, a comparison of the 2013 and 2014 data suggests that it may have been as low as 40 percent in areas subsequently controlled by pro-Russia combatants. The gap between these disputed areas and the rest of Ukraine is striking, as the next lowest proportion of children in Ukrainian schools was 70 percent (in Odesa). All data from *Vseukraïns´kyi komitet zakhystu ukraïns´koï movy*, "Stanovyshche ukraïns´koï movy."
68. Moser, *Language Policy*, 54.
69. Kulyk even noted an increase in the use of Russian in the younger urban cohorts outside of western Ukraine. Volodymyr Kulyk, "The Age Factor in Language Practices and Attitudes: Continuity and Change in Ukrainian Bilingualism," *Nationalities Papers* 43, no. 2 (2015): 283–301.
70. A Russian-language version can be found in "O iazykakh v Ukrainskoi SSR," *Nationalities Papers* 23, no. 3 (1995): 644–52.
71. Vseukraïns´kyï komitet zakhystu ukraïns´koï movy, "Stanovyshche ukraïns'koï movy."
72. Dominique Arel and Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine Under Kuchma: Back to 'Eurasia'?" *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no. 32 (19 August 1994): 1–12.
73. "Constitution of Ukraine," *Legislation Online*.
74. Rishennia Konstytutsiinoho Sudu Ukraïny," 14 December 1999, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v010p710-99/print1111462132802221. In a letter to Ukraine Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko in 2001, OSCE High Commissionner Max van der Stoel asserted that Ukrainian lawmakers were bound constitutionally to establish in law the parameters of this "guaranteed" public use of Russian: "The legislator can use no stronger expression [than "guarantee"]. It means that that [he] has chosen a mandatory, and not a permissive system of granting rights."
75. Council of Europe, "European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages," 1992, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/148.htm.

76. The figure of 20 percent was reportedly linked to a bilateral agreement with Romania regarding the treatment of each other's minorities.
77. As we saw, the threshold in the 1989 law was 50 percent, which restricted the use of Russian as a de facto regional language to Crimea.
78. Moser offers a thorough review of the debates surrounding the 2012 law in *Language Policy*.
79. In its legal opinion, the Venice Commission saw the draft as "unbalanced, as its provisions were disproportionately strengthening the position of the Russian language" and found "questionable" that "the parallel use of…mostly the [State language and the] Russian language in large spheres of public life…can still be considered to be in compliance with article 10 of the Constitution, as clarified by the Constitutional Court." Venice Commission, "Opinion on the Draft Law on Languages in Ukraine" (2011): 9, online at http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2011)008-e.
80. Venice Commission,"Opinion on the Draft Law."
81. Canadian bilingualism only applies to select federal offices in areas where at least 5 percent of the population is Francophone. Only 7 percent of Anglophones outside Quebec actually speak French.
82. Dominique Arel, "Double Talk: Why Ukrainians Fight Over Language," *Foreign Affairs*, 18 March 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2014-03-18/double-talk.
83. It is admittedly a huge problem in the core areas of Donbas, and this study avoids making inferences on a possible settlement, as the matter is primarily one of hard security.
84. The loss of Crimea and of core Donbas has meant that the proportion of eastern Ukrainians in the Ukrainian electorate has fallen to the low 40 percent.
85. Serhiy Kudelia, "Ukraine's 2014 Presidential Election Result is Unlikely to Be Repeated," Monkey Cage Blog, *Washington Post*, 2 June 2014.