Harvard Ukrainian Studies 36, no. 1–2 (2019): 105–122.

ARTICLES

Conflicting Legitimacies in the Triangle of the Noghay Hordes, Crimean Khanate, and Ottoman Empire

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The Noghays played an important role in the politics of Dasht-i Qipchaq (Polovtsian Steppe) between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries but there were noteworthy differences between them and the Golden Horde's other Tatar successor states and societies. First, the leaders of the Noghay Hordes descended from the famous Mangıt Bey Edige rather than Chinggis Khan. Additionally, the Noghays insisted on maintaining their traditional steppe life even after the arrival of the Kalmyks and after Moscow's growing power in the Dasht-i Qipchaq forced the Noghays to become subjects of Moscow or the Ottoman-Crimean sphere. The aim of this study is to examine the integration process of the Noghays into Crimea, then an Ottoman protectorate. In this integration process, the Crimean Khan saw the Noghays as his traditional subjects and tried to legitimize his authority on the basis of the "*töre* of Chinggis Khan," while the Ottoman state used Islam. In turn, the Noghays' tribal leaders used "tribal *töre*" to legitimize their authority.

Historical Setting: The Collapse of the Golden Horde and the Rise of the New Khanates and Noghay Horde

The aim of this study is to understand the relationships and conflicts of three political organizations—the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Khanate, and Noghay Hordes—between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Crimean Khanate and Noghay Hordes both emerged after the fall of the Golden Horde and were very similar in terms of ethnicity.

Like these states, the Ottoman Empire also emerged as a result of the demographic and political transformations caused by the Mongol invasion, albeit outside the sphere of the Chinggisid political legacy. To understand the relationships between these communities, we must first focus on the political history of Dasht-i Qipchaq.

The Golden Horde was founded after the second Qipchaq campaign led by Chinggis Khan's grandson, Batu, in 1241. At the height of its power, the Golden Horde dominated the area between the Kazakh steppes and Danube River from its capital in Sarai. This tremendous empire, which left its mark on the history of Eastern Europe, entered a period of decline at the beginning of the fifteenth century as a result of chronic internal conflicts, the consequences of Tamerlane's fatal expeditions, and the rising power of Moscow. During this process, new political organizations emerged, including the Horde of Noghays and the khanates of Crimea, Kazan, Hacı Tarhan (Astrakhan), and Sibir. At first Seyyid Ahmed Khan, and then later Şeyh Ahmed Khan, tried to stop this political fragmentation and maintain the unity of the Golden Horde. Consequently, the newly emerging political structures, especially the Crimean Khanate, struggled to protect their independence from these last two great khans of the Golden Horde.

However, the murder of Seyyid Ahmed Khan in 1481 and the destruction of the capital Sarai in 1502 made it impossible for the Golden Horde to survive.[1] In 1475, the Ottoman Empire entered the region as a new player following Gedik Ahmed Pasha's conquest of the Genoese colonies at Caffa (Kefe), Soldia (Sudak), and Cembalo (Balıklava), as well as of the Greek principality of Thedoro (Mankub). As a result of these conquests, the Crimean Khanate became a protectorate of the Ottoman Empire.[2]

Other important political developments that had evolved between 1450 and 1502 such as the indirect alliances between the powerhouses of Crimea, the Noghay Horde, and Moscow came to an end with the destruction of Sarai in 1502. The Crimean Khanate began its struggle to revive the Golden Horde under its own banner. Mehmed I Giray was the first great representative of this ideal but, together with his son, he was killed by the Noghays as he returned from an expedition to Hacı Tarhan. The Noghays followed this by raiding the Crimean Peninsula. Mehmed I Giray's death temporarily ended Crimean initiatives to reestablish the Golden Horde until Sahip I Giray revived these hopes

during his leadership. However, the latter's death in 1551, caused by an Ottoman-backed plot, dealt the terminal blow to the Crimean Khans' dreams of unity.[3]

Meanwhile, at the beginning of the second half of the sixteenth century, the Noghay Horde began to disperse as a result of internal conflicts and long-lasting famines. First, the Altıoğul (Six Sons) Noghays established themselves around the Emba River under the leadership of the sons of Mamay Mirza. Then the Noghays who migrated to the lands around the Azov Sea established the Lesser Noghay Hordes and became the first Noghay vassal horde to accept the suzerainty of the Crimean Khanate. Those Noghays who did not migrate to, or settle in, the Volga region came to be called "Great Noghays." Now as then, they preserved their independence even while coming under the nominal control of Moscow.[4] Parallel to these developments, small and leaderless Noghay communities also settled in the Budjak area and accepted direct Ottoman rule.[5]

After 1610, the Great Noghay Horde came under considerable pressure with the westward advance of the Kalmyk Mongols. Some sections of the Great Noghay population accepted Kalmyk rule but most migrated further west and joined the Crimean Khanate. Ongoing Kalmyk pressure resulted in the migration of some of the Great and Lesser Noghays to the Ottoman districts and their settlement in the area of Budjak in 1665–1666.[6]

Different Traditions: Conflicting Legitimacies

The three political organizations that I discussed briefly in historical perspective originated from steppe culture. The Ottoman Empire evolved from an understanding of statehood that was steeped in steppe life towards one of a centralized state, an attribute for which it attracted attention at the height of its power.[7] As for the Noghay Horde and Crimean Khanate, they were heirs to two different steppe traditions. To understand these traditions, we must examine the history of the steppe states of Inner Asia.

In the steppe of Inner Asia, states emerged from the union of different tribes around a sacred clan.[8] In most of the early Turkic states, scholars have argued that this was the Ashina clan.[9] However,

steppe states such as those of the Huns and Kök Turks were beset by constant internal conflicts as the tribal leaders (*begs*) were centrifugal political forces and contributed to internal conflicts in these states by dissenting from the centralization policies of the Qaghans. A series of internal conflicts in the history of Kök Turks Quaganate and, at a later period, after the Islamization of the Turks, the Oghuz revolts against the Selijukids, should be viewed in this context. There are numerous other examples of similar state evolutions in the history of the steppe.[10]

The Noghay Horde and Crimean Khanate were heirs to the political and cultural heritage of the most effective steppe empire in world history: the Chinggisid Empire. To tackle the centrifugal tendencies in the steppe states, Chinggis Khan and his heirs created a centralist state with the aim of unifying them around the personality of the khans. Chinggis Khan used a military community called *nökers* that answered only to him and stood outside tribal relations to establish and protect this centralized system. In addition, first Chinggis Khan and then his successors dispersed the tribal confederations through forced relocations.[11] Chinggis Khan's successors supported this centralist conception of the state by creating a personality cult around him;[12] for example, they codified the orders of Chinggis Khan to compose the famous Great Yasa.[13]

Despite these efforts, Chinggis's empire disintegrated after Möngke Khan died during a campaign to China in 1259.[14] The Golden Horde emerged from the ashes before collapsing in its turn at the end of the fifteenth century, leaving a legacy in the form of the Noghay Horde and the khanates of Crimea, Kasım, Sibir, Kazan, and Astrakhan. This moment saw a significant break with the traditional political mentality. In the new khanates all the leaders were descendants of Chinggis Khan[15] except for the Noghay Horde, whose leaders were descendants of the famous Mangıt[16] Beg Edige.[17]

Even Uli Schamiloglu, the author of a notable work on the political systems of the successor states of the Mongol Empire, was unable to place the Noghay Horde within his "Four Bey System" theory of political development in these states.[18] Thus, the establishment of the Noghay Horde as an independent political entity can be interpreted as a challenge to the legitimacy of the Chinggisid khans of Eurasia. The title of khan represented the legitimizing power of the Chinggisids.[19]

This is why neither Tamerlane, the greatest conqueror of his era, nor Noghay leaders were able to use the title of khan in their lifetime.

There were no serious clashes between the Crimean Khanate and Noghay Horde until the former developed and implemented a policy of uniting the Golden Horde's political successor states. Conflict between the Noghays and Crimean Khanate began with the destruction of Sarai in 1502. Crimea's increasing power and unification policies strained relations between the two states. This process ended with the murder of the powerful Crimean Khan, Mehmed I Giray, together with his son, as he returned from an expedition to Hacı Tarhan (Astrakhan). The killing of Mehmed I Giray and his son, as well as the use of violence against the ostensibly sacred khans, symbolized the Noghays' rejection of the system of Chinggisid political legitimacy.[20]

The ensuing conflict between the Noghays and Crimean Khans was described in the epics of the Noghays and in Crimean chronicles. In the famous Noghay epic *Mamay*, the Crimean Khan was depicted in a negative light and his murder was represented as a success for the Noghay mirzas.[21] By contrast, the eighteenth-century chronicles of the Crimean Khanate were highly derogatory towards the Noghay leaders when describing the murder of Mehmed I Giray.[22]

It can be assumed that these clashes were reflected in the form of ideological conflict in discourses of legitimation between the Noghay and Crimean leaders in this period. Records in the Crimean chronicles indicated that humiliating remarks were made about the genealogy of the Noghay leaders.[23] Noghays responded to these rumors by invoking the narrative of Baba Tükles. In this narrative, they claimed that their ancestor, Edige, was a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad's loyal friend Abu Bakr, thereby seeking political legitimacy within the framework of Islamic culture.[24] The narrative of Baba Tükles provided the Noghay mirzas with an important argument in support of their political legitimacy and authority in their own society.

However, in reality, the blood-based relationships formed over centuries, and focused on tribal affiliation,[25] were more effective in the legitimization of the ruling of Noghay mirzas than this narrative. The basis of this type of traditional relationship was the concept of *törü* (or *töre*, custom), a feature of the steppe legal system. Historians have described *törü* as a set of mandatory rules that regulated the social life of early Turks.[26] In the Orkhon Inscriptions, *törü* was used in the

definitions of state laws, rules, regulations and ceremonies.[27] In Mahmud al-Kashgari's famous work *Dīwān Luγāt at-Turk* (Compendium of the Turkic Dialects), the importance of *törü* was emphasized by the line "el kalır törü qalmas" (the realm may be left behind but not custom).[28]

The conflict between the Noghay Horde and the Crimean Khanate continued during Sahip I Giray's reign. Sahip I Giray dealt a heavy blow to the Noghays, who were planning to attack the Crimean Khanate, when he brutally murdered Baki Beg, the Noghays' representative in the Crimean Khanate, along with his brothers. At this point, the presence of the Mangıt tribe in the Crimean Khanate began to attract attention. We know that between the years 1490 and 1502 leaders of the Mangıts, who formed the core of the Noghay tribal federation, became part of the Crimean Khanate. They went by the names of Mansurogullari and Diveyogullari as well as Mangıt.[29]

The differences between the Mangıts and the powerful Shirin tribe, also in the Crimean Khanate, were obvious from the beginning. The Shirins did not strive for independence even when at their most powerful, namely in the era of Eminek Beg. They were also effective administrators in the khanate, supporting different pretenders to the throne. By contrast, under the leadership of Kantemir Mirza,[30] the Mangıts of Crimea reached the height of their power and almost became an independent political entity.

The forces of the Mansurogullari and other tribal Noghay leaders who acted independently were eliminated by the Crimean Khanate with the connivance of the Ottoman Empire. The conflict between the Mangıts and the khans led to outright confrontation. Bahadır I Giray Khan sought to legitimize his killing of Noghay mirzas by taking *fetva* (religious approval) from the Mufti of Caffa, Afifeddin Efendi.[31] Citing archival sources, Aleksei Novosel'skii argues that more than forty mirzas, and even their sons, were killed on the orders of the Khan.[32] As such, all the mirzas and any sons who had reached puberty were massacred indiscriminately despite the basic dictum in Islamic law that ascribes only personal responsibility for a crime.

Noghays between the Ottoman Empire and Crimean Khanate

The mass migration of Noghays to the Crimean Khanate occurred at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Noghays first settled on

the territory of the Crimean Khanate as a result of ongoing Kalmyk pressure before moving to the Budjak region, which was a precinct of the Ottoman Empire in 1665. After this resettlement the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Khanate, and the Noghays greatly increased their dealings with one another. While the Ottoman Empire, thinking of the Kalmyk and Cossack threat, approved of the Noghays' move to Budjak, the Crimean Khanate was disturbed by the possibility of losing a community that the Khan saw as his traditional subjects.[33]

Early in 1666, Mehmed IV Giray organized a major punitive expedition to Budjak where the Noghays were treated with utmost severity. In his writings Evliya Chelebi, an eyewitness of this expedition, articulated his disgust at the violence and rapes committed by the Crimean forces against the Noghays.[34] Although the aggressor and the victim belonged to the same religion and were ethnically very similar, the violence used in this episode can be seen as a manifestation of the incompatible narratives of legitimization used by the Noghay mirzas, Crimean khans, and Ottoman administration.

The Ottoman Empire removed Mehmed IV Giray from the throne of the Crimean Khanate and returned the Noghays to the Budjak region. With the return of the Noghays to the Ottoman precinct, the Ottoman Empire established itself as a third actor, stronger both in terms of political legitimacy and power, in the legitimization conflicts between the Noghay mirzas and Crimean khans. However, following these bloody episodes, the centralizing mentality of the Ottoman Empire came into conflict with that of the Noghay mirzas, namely through disputes over tax collection. Ottoman tax collectors were killed by Noghays,[35] and in response the Ottomans exiled the Noghays to the territory of the Crimean Khanate. Later the Ottoman Empire gave permission for the Noghays to return due to the poor economic conditions of the region caused by the exile. The decision was also influenced by a need to use the Noghays as an auxiliary force and by the wish to prevent the Noghays from causing problems in the running of the Crimean Khanate.

During the long war with the Holy League, the Noghays were critically important to the Ottoman army on the Polish front both in terms of military might and agricultural production. From 1665 to 1700, it appears that changes occurred in the lives of Noghays who settled in the Budjak region. Mirzas and their nökers, who can be understood as the Noghay nobility, achieved great autonomy and power through

income from the slave trade, especially during long periods of war. The Ottoman Empire increased its control and implemented a centralized policy on the Polish border in order to avoid new conflicts after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699). Naturally, their tightened control and increased centralization gave rise to social tensions in the region. A rebellion broke out among the Noghays and was suppressed with difficultly by the Ottomans and Crimeans.[36]

The rebellion that took place in 1699 is very important for understanding Noghay society and relations between the Noghays, Crimeans, and Ottomans. First, this incident showed the scale of change within the Noghay society as, after the suppression of the rebellion, some Noghays abandoned their mirzas in their struggle with the Crimean Khan.[37] Second, the Ottoman central administration introduced new regulations, based on the 1665 arrangements, pertaining to the administration and cultural life of Noghay society. An examination of these regulations indicates that the Ottoman officials tried to reduce or eliminate tribal leaders' authority over the Noghays. To do so, they sought to undermine the traditional steppe law of *töre*.

Ottoman officials decided to establish "institutionalized Islamic understanding" among the Noghays by opening madrasas and mosques to replace *töre*. In addition, representatives of the Ottoman legal system, *Qadıs* (judges), were appointed to adjudicate on the legal matters of the Noghay tribes.[38] From the beginning, Ottoman policy towards the Noghay population that settled directly on Ottoman territory primarily aimed to establish Ottoman law and diminish the authority of mirzas. This policy can be traced back to 1610.[39]

New Hordes, Rising Tensions, and the Fall of the Crimean Khanate (1700–1783)

As the seventeenth century drew to a close, Noghays living under the Crimean Khanate essentially comprised two groups. The first populated a region stretching from the castle of Azov to the Caucasus mountains and the second group lived in the Budjak region. While the Caucasus Noghays were related to the Lesser Noghay Horde founded by Gazi bin Urak in 1550, the Budjak Horde's emergence was in response to the aforementioned Kalmyk pressure. Between 1697

and 1723, three Noghay hordes became part of the Crimean Khanate: the Jedisan, Jedishkul, and Jamboiluk Hordes.

Jedisan (in translation, seven tribes, or 70,000 men) Noghays were one of the ethnic groups that comprised the Astrakhan Tatars. Kanay, the beg of the Jedisan tribe was also the leader of the Great Noghay Horde in the 1630s. They became Kalmyk subjects between 1615 and 1645. Jedishkul (in translation, seven sons or the beg's seven-strong household) Noghays were often mentioned alongside the Jedisans and the first document mentioning the name Jedishkul dates from 1616. They probably came under Kalmyk control at the same time as the Jedisans. The third group comprised Jamboiluk (in translation, living along the Emba river) Noghays and the descendants of Altıoğul (Six Sons) Noghays. The latter were the first Noghay group to accept Kalmyk authority.[40] In 1646, all three Noghay groups were listed among the Kalmyks' subjects.[41]

Jedisan, Jedishkul, and Jamboiluk Noghays gradually became part of the Crimean Khanate. Based on Russian archival sources, Bi-Arslan Kochekaev claimed that Jedishkul Noghays migrated to the Kuban, taking parts of the Jedisan and Jamboiluk Noghays along with them, in 1696.[42] According to Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Agha, an Ottoman chronicler of that period, thirty thousand Noghays (probably Jedishkuls) fled to the Kuban as a first wave. Then, after serious clashes with the Kalmyks, the Jedisan and Jamboiluk Noghays were brought under Crimean authority in 1698.[43]

After these migrations, as understood from the Ottoman archival records for 1699, another group of Jedisan Noghays fled from the Kalmyks and also migrated to the Kuban.[44] Kalmyk efforts to return these Noghay groups to areas they controlled were partially effective in the early stages but were halted by the civil war that began after Ayuka Khan's death. The vast majority of Noghays continued to live under the rule of the Crimean Khanate as of 1723.[45]

After the integration of these three new tribes, Noghay forces formed the dominant military element of the Crimean Khanate. Johann Thunmann puts the number of Noghay troops at seventy thousand, comprising archers from the Budjak-Jedisan-Jedishkul and Jamboiluks Hordes in the last days of the khanate.[46] Tension between the Crimean rulers and the Noghay elites was exacerbated by the political, military and economic developments of the period. This included the

fact that the Ottoman administration pursued an isolationist policy and tried to avoid international conflicts after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700),[47] a policy they generally followed in the eighteenth century.

The natural consequence of this policy was increasing control over the empire's border areas. Simultaneous to this Ottoman push for greater control, the Crimean Khanate appointed *seraskers* (governors from the Giray royal family), first to Budjak and the Kuban and then to Jedisan Noghays, to control the rising Noghay population.[48] Meanwhile, from the economic point of view, "the war economy" began to experience difficulties. The decrease in the income obtained from the slave trade damaged the economic power of the Crimean and Noghay elites after the Treaty of Karlowitz.[49] In this period, Noghays began to engage in agriculture and to supply Istanbul with livestock and agricultural products.[50] This only added to their economic importance. The rise of the city and port of Hodjabey—the future Odessa—is not accidental in this context.[51] These developments led the Crimean Khans to increase their economic pressure on the Noghays, whom they saw as a new source of income.

The rising tensions between the Crimean Khanate, Noghays, and the Ottoman Empire were manifested by three great rebellions in the eighteenth century, namely the rebellions of Adil and Baht Giray Sultan, which took place in the first quarter of the century, and the Noghay Rebellions of 1756–1758. The main power behind Baht Giray Sultan, who was an independent ruler in the Kuban region until his death, was the Jedisan and Jamboiluk tribes who had migrated to the Kuban. The Jedisan and Jamboiluk Noghays supported Baht Giray Sultan mainly because the Kuban steppe was insufficient to support the transhumant Noghay lifestyle after the recent migrations, and also because of the prevention of profitable raids into Russian and Kalmyk lands by order of the Ottoman central administration. Besides this, Kalmyk and Russian raids into the Kuban caused new tensions.[52]

In 1728, the Ottoman administration tried to resolve both the pasture problem and the Kalmyk threat by resettling the Jedisan and Jedishkul Noghays from the Kuban region to both sides of the Dnieper (Özü) river.[53] Adil Giray Sultan was the leader of the 1728 Noghay Rebellion in the Budjak region. The main reasons for this rebellion were the decline of the war economy and the lack of grassland, as

with the Kuban rebellion. The Noghay rebels' basic request was to be able to continue to use the land they had taken from Moldavia (Bogdan). Ottoman officials managed to suppress this rebellion without bloodshed but afterwards the Noghays received new lands from the territory of Moldavia adjacent to the Halil Paşa Yurdu.[54] After these relocations, the geographical dispersion of the Noghay Hordes remained constant for nearly forty years (1728–1768). Budjak Noghays spanned from the Danube to the Dniester, the Jedisan Horde from the Dniester to Buh, the Jedishkul Noghays from the Buh to Berda, and the Jamboiluk Noghays from the Dnieper to Perekop.[55]

The rebellion of 1756–1758 revealed the tensions between the Noghays and the Ottoman-Crimean bloc. This rebellion clearly demonstrated the Noghays' rejection of Crimean-Ottoman rule. In this rebellion, the members of the Giray dynasty were involved only in the last stage of the rebellion while in previous rebellions the leadership was headed by members of the Giray dynasty. The main reason for this rebellion was the increasing authority and levies imposed by the Crimean Khanate upon the Jedisan Noghay society. The rebellion quickly spread to other Noghay Hordes and turned into a common Noghay rebellion.

Even before this rebellion, in 1754–1755, the Jedisan Noghays had sent a delegation to Saint Petersburg asking to become a vassal of the Russian Empire. The Russian state rejected this request as it was preoccupied with the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). The Ottoman state instilled a temporary calm by changing the khan and listening to the demands of the Noghays. Yet, as Kochekaev argues, this rebellion dealt a blow to the position of the Ottoman Empire and its Crimean Khanate vassal in Eastern Europe, paving the way for the Russian advance.[56]

In conclusion, the main goal of the Ottoman Empire was to destroy *töre* and make the Noghay Tatars subjects (*teba'a*) of the empire rather than members of a tribe. By opening madrasas and mosques and appointing *Qadıs*, the Ottoman state tried to impose its methods of political legitimization on the various social strata of Noghay society.[57] Islam was the main component of these policies. Despite all these efforts, the Ottoman state failed to completely demolish the power of steppe law and the authority of mirzas over Noghay Tatar society. The main evidence for this was the cooperation of most Jedisan, Jamboiluk, and Budjak Tatars with the Russians in the war of 1768–1774.[58]

However, the centralization policies, justified by religion, did create a conservative section of Noghay society and these conservatives rejected cooperation with the Russians.[59]

Notes

1. There is an extensive literature on the history of the Golden Horde, beginning with the renowned work of Joseph Hammer. See Joseph Hammer, *Geschichte der Goldenen Horde in Kiptschak* (Pest, 1840); Magamet Safargaliev, *Raspad Zolotoi Ordy* (Saransk, 1960); Boris Grekov and Aleksandr Iakubovskii, *Zolotaia Orda i ee padenie* (Moscow, 1950); Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde* (London, 1987); Akdes Nimet Kurat, *IV–XVIII: Yüzyıllarda Karadeniz Kuzeyindeki Türk Kavimleri ve Devletleri* (Ankara, 1992), 119–51; Mustafa Kafalı, "Altın-Orda Hanlığı," in *Genel Türk Tarihi*, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel and Ali Birinci (Ankara, 2002), 5:75–98; İlyas Kamalov, *Altın Orda ve Rusya: Rusya Üzerindeki Türk-Tatar Etkisi* (İstanbul, 2009), 64–112; Marie Favereau–Doumenjou, "New Collective Monograph: The Golden Horde in World History," *Golden Horde Review* 4, no. 4 (2016): 918–23.
2. Halil İnalcık, "Yeni Vesikalara Göre Kırım Hanlığı'nın Osmanlı Tabiliğine Girmesi ve Ahidname Meselesi," *Belleten* 8, no. 30 (1944): 185–229; Yücel Öztürk, "Kırım Hanlığı," in Güzel and Birinci, *Genel Türk Tarihi,* 5:153–54; Muzaffer Ürekli, *Kırım Hanlığı'nın Kuruluşu ve Osmanlı Himayesinde Yükselişi (1441–1569)* (Ankara, 1989), 16–20.
3. Oleksa Gaivoronskii, *Poveliteli dvukh materikov: Krymskie khany XV–XVI stoletii i bor´ba za nasledstvo Velikoi Ordy*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 2010), 131–65, 203–47; Ürekli, *Kırım*, 24–26, 30–44.
4. Zeki Velidi Togan, *Bugünkü Türkili Türkistan ve Yakın Tarih* (Istanbul, 1981), 38, 139–47; Aleksei Novosel'skii, *Bor´ba moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v pervoi polovine XVII veka* (Moscow, 1948), 15–17.
5. For this process, see Alper Başer, "Bucak Tatarları (1550–1700)" (PhD diss., University of Afyon Kocatepe, 2010), 23–26.
6. Ibid., 141–52.
7. For centralization in the Ottoman Empire, see Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization, and Economy; Collected Studies* (London, 1978), 43. Ömer Lütfi Barkan exposes the permanent struggle of the centralist Ottoman

government with the local feudal leaders, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Timar," in *MEB İslam Ansiklopedisi* 12, no. 1 (1985): 297–98.

8. For the Qaghanate of Turks, see Peter P. Golden, *An Introduction to the History of the Turkic People: Ethnogenesis and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East* (Wiesbaden, 1992), 119, 146; İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Türk Milli Kültürü* (Istanbul, 2003), 227–33.
9. Kafesoğlu, *Türk Milli Kültürü*, 97, 155–56, 168, 202–3.
10. In the Orkhon Inscriptions, the conflict between the begs and khans can be traced from first-hand accounts, see Hüseyin Namık Orkun, *Eski Türk Yazıtları* (Ankara, 1994), 31, 32, 38–41, 48–50, 60, 62. For the Oghuz revolt against the Seljukids, see Osman Turan, *Selçuklular Târihi ve Türk-İslam Medeniyeti* (Istanbul, 1997), 246–47.
11. Golden, *Introduction to the History of the Turkic People*, 291.
12. It has been suggested that the main reason for writing the *Secret History of Mongols* was to create a myth around the personality of Chinggis Khan; see Igor de Rachewiltz, *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century,* vol. 2 (Leiden-Boston, 2004). On the formation process of this ideology, see de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Ideological Foundations of Chinggis Khan's Empire," in *The History of Mongolia*, ed. David Sneath and Cristopher Kaplonski (Folkestone, 2010), 1:165–73.
13. Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Reflections on Činggis Qan's Jasar," in Sneath and Kaplonski, *History of Mongolia,* 1:212–28.
14. Peter Jackson, "The Mongol Age in Eastern Inner Asia," in *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo, Allen J. Frank and Peter B. Golden (Cambridge, 2009), 39–40.
15. Bertold Spuler, "Cingizids," in *Encyclopedia of Islam,* 2nd ed., ed. Peri Bearman et al., vol. 2 (Leiden, 1965), 44–47.
16. The Mangit tribe was one of the tribes that belonged to the Nirun branch of the Mongols. They joined Chinggis Khan under the leadership of Quyildar. After the disintegration of the Chinggisid Empire, the Mangit tribe was scattered across the Mongol *ulus* but they played an especially important political role in the history of the Golden Horde, see Iurii Bregel, "Mangits," in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., ed. Peri Bearman et al., vol. 4 (Leiden, 1978), 417–18; Vadim Trepavlov, *The Formation and Early History of the Manghït Yurt* (Bloomington, Ind., 2001), 4–47.

17. For the life, career and genealogy of Edige, see Vadim Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi Ordy* (Moscow, 2001), 62–90, 655–58; Trepavlov, *Formation and Early History*, 12–20; Istvan Vasary, "Noghay," in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., ed. Peri Bearman et al., vol. 8 (Leiden, 1995), 85–86; Bi-Arslan Kochekaev, *Nogaisko-russkie otnosheniia v XV–XVIII vv.* (Almaty, 1988), 19–20.
18. Uli Schamiloglu, "Tribal Politics and Social Organization in the Golden Horde" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1986), 31–32; Schamiloglu, "The Qaraçı Beys of the Later Golden Horde: Notes on the Organization of the Mongol World Empire," *Archivum Eurasiae Medıı Aevı* 4 (1984): 283–97.
19. Beatrice Forbes Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane* (Cambridge, 1989), 14–15; İsmail Aka, "Timurlular," in Güzel and Birinci, *Genel Türk Tarihi,* 5:213.
20. On the absence of bloodshed, see Fuad Köprülü, "Türk ve Moğol Sülalelerinde Hanedan Azasının İdamında Kan Dökme Memnuiyeti," in *İslam ve Türk Hukuk Tarihi Araştırmaları ve Vakıf Müessesesi*, ed. Mehmet Köprülü (İstanbul, 1983), 71–79; for the life of Mehmed Giray, see Vladimir Sıroeçkovskiy, *Muhammed Giray Han ve Vasalları, Kırım Tarihi,* trans. Kemal Ortaylı (Istanbul, 1979).
21. İhsan Kalenderoğlu, *Mamay, Nogay Türklerinin Destanı*, ed. Murat Yıldız (Ankara, 2010), 18–49.
22. Halim Giray, *Gülbün-ü Hanân*, OR 11,164, folio 31b, British Library, London, UK; Yavuz Söylemez, "Es-seb'üs Seyyâr Fî Ahbâr-I Mülûki't-Tatar, Tenkitli Metin Neşri İnceleme" (PhD diss., Ege University, 2016), 126. In this dissertation, Yavuz Söylemez edited and transliterated Seyyid Mehmed Rıza's famous *As-Sab'al-Sayyar fî Ahbâr al Müluku't-Tatar* into the modern Turkish alphabet.
23. Abd al-Gaffar Kırımî*, Umdat al-Tawarikh*, ed. Necib Asım (Istanbul, 1924), 203.
24. Abd al-Gaffar Kırımî, *Umdat,* 203–4; For the narrative of Baba Tükles and the genealogy of Edige in this narrative, see: Devin De Weese, *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition* (University Park, Pa., 1994), 321–408.
25. Joseph Fletcher defined and described the tribe as follows: "The tribe was the basic unit of society. It had its own traditions, institutions, customs, beliefs and myths of common ancestry…and the idea of a shared identity.

All members of the tribe, including the common people (*haran*), were by tradition considered descendants of a single ancestor." See Joseph Fletcher, "The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46, no. 1 (June 1986): 16. A seventeenth-century Ottoman observer, Abdullah bin Rıdvan, argued that the tribes had their own customs and laws: "bunlardan ma'ada Şirin Beyleri ve Kırım mirzaları vardır ki her birisinin taht-ı hükümetinde niçe bin Tatar hidmet-güzârları vardır. Töreleri ya'ni adetleri ve kânunlarıdır" (besides these, there are the Şirin Beğs and Crimean mirzas, of whom all have thousands of Tatars in their service at their manors. "Töres," simply put, are their customs and their laws). See Abdullah bin Rıdvan Osman ü'l Kırımî, *Tevârih-i Deşt-i Kıpçak*, ed. Rasih Selçuk Uysal (Istanbul, 2016), 47.

26. Kafesoğlu, *Türk Milli Kültürü*, 246–47; Sadri Maksudi Arsal, *Türk Tarihi ve Hukuk* (Istanbul, 1947), 287–91; Salim Koca, "The State Tradition and Organization Among Ancient Turks," in *The Turks*, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz, and Osman Karatay, vol. 1 (Ankara, 2014), 705.
27. Talat Tekin, *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic* (Bloomington, 1967), 385.
28. Robert Dankoff and James Kelly, *Mahmūd al-Kāšgarī: Compendium of the Turkic Dialects (Dīwān Luγāt at-Turk),* pt. 2 (Duxbury, Mass., 1984), 264, 542.
29. Sıroeçkovskiy, *Muhammed Giray Han,* 97–102; Novosel'skii, *Bor´ba moskovskogo gosudarstva*, 21n6, 390n95. For the history of the Mangıt tribe in the Crimean Khanate, see Alper Başer, "Kırım Hanlığı Tarihinde Mangıt Kabilesi," in *Doğu Avrupa Türk Mirasının Son Kalesi Kırım*, ed. Yücel Öztürk (İstanbul, 2015), 75–101.
30. For the life of Kantemir Mirza, see Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 76–130.
31. Seyyid Mehmed Rıza, *As-Sab'al-Sayyar,* 207–8; Halim Giray describes this event as "Kefe müftîsi Afîfeddin Efendi'nin virdiği fetvâ-yı şerîfe mûcibince kabîle-i merkûmenin istîsâlleri îcâb itmekle vâsıl-ı sinn-i bülûğ olmayanlardan mâ'adâ bi'l-cümle ümerâ-yı Mansûriyye'yi kahr ü tedmîr itmekden nâşî kesb-i istiklâl-i tâm idüb" (According to the noble fatwa issued by Afîfeddin Efendi, the Mufti of Caffa, the aforementioned tribes were to be exterminated, with the exception of those who had not reached the age of puberty. With all the amirs of Mansur destroyed and crushed, [the Khan] gained total independence); see in Halim Giray, *Gülbün-ü Hanan*, 44a.
32. Novosel'skii, *Bor´ba moskovskogo gosudarstva*, 283.

33. See the yarlıg of the khans in Vladimir Velyaminov-Zernov, *Kırım Yurtına ve Ol Taraflarga Dair Bolgan Yarlıklar ve Hatlar*, ed. Melek Özyetgin and İlyas Kamalov (Ankara, 2009), 19, 31–32, 34.
34. Evliya Çelebi, *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi, Yedinci Kitap*, ed. Seyit Ali Kahraman, Yücel Dağlı, and Robert Dankoff (Istanbul, 2003), 190–92; for an evaluation of this settlement process, see Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 141–46.
35. Söylemez, *As-Sab'al-Sayyar*, 260; Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 153.
36. See Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 161–8.
37. These mirzas took refuge among the Cossacks, see: Uğur Demir, "*Târih-i Mehmed Giray*, Değerlendirme-Çeviri Metin" (master's thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul 2006), 130. In this thesis, Uğur Demir edited and transliterated Mehmed Giraj's chronicle, *Tarikh-ı Mehmed Giraj* into the modern Turkish alphabet.
38. For the 1665 arrangements, see Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler (henceforth MAD) 607, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives, henceforth BOA), Istanbul, Turkey. MAD 607 is a *daftar* composed of the *hudjdjas* (*hüccet*). In Islamic literature, *hüccet* means proof and presentation of proof but in Ottoman legal terminology it was the name given to documents that contained the statement or testimony of one of the parties and approval of this statement by the other party in the presence of a Qadi. This *daftar* detailed the settlement of Noghays and its conditions, "kendi beynlerinde olan törelerin terk edip" (abandoning the customs that existed among themselves) (p. 11), and "mezbûrun mirzalar cümle nökerleriyle ra'iyyet kabul idüp" (aforementioned mirzas with all their followers accepting the status of tax-paying subjects [of the Ottoman Empire]) (p. 12). For details on the situation after the suppression of the revolt, see Uşşâkizâde Es-Seyyid İbrahim Hasîb Efendi, *Uşşâkizâde Târihi,* vol. 1, ed. Raşit Gündoğdu (Istanbul, 2000), 451; MAD 101146, p. 52, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey; Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 203–4.
39. Catalog Code of the Mühimme Daftars (henceforth ADVNSMHM) 79, p. 62, verdict 156, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey; Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 201–2.
40. Trepavlov, *Istoriia Nogaiskoi Ordy*, 434–49.
41. Kochekaev, *Nogaisko-russkie otnosheniia*, 122.
42. Kochekaev, *Nogaisko-russkie otnosheniia*, 130.

43. Silâhdâr Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, *Nusretnâme*, ed. Mehmet Topal (Ankara, 2018), 366–70.
44. A. E. II. Mustafa Dosya 2, Gömlek Sıra No 139, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey.
45. Vladimir Tepkeev, "Kalmytsko-krymskie otnosheniia v XVIII veke (1700–1771 gg.)" (PhD diss., Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, 2005), 36–68.
46. Tunmann [Johann Thunmann], *Krymskoe khanstvo*, trans. N. L. Ernst and S. L. Beliavskaia (Simferopol, 1996), 49.
47. For the determinants of this isolationist policy after Karlowitz, see Ewan Ames, "The Isolationist Stance of the Ottoman Empire, 1700–1711" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1971), 130–60. The "Tulip Period" between 1718–1730 and the years 1739–1768, which are called the "Long Peace" or "Fabulous Languor" in Ottoman history, also reflect this pacifist attitude.
48. These two documents put forth that, as of 1736, Budjak and Kuban *seraskerlik*s were institutionalized; see ADVNSMHM 142, p. 53, verdict 252, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey; ADVNSMHM 142, p. 266, verdict 1148, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey. For the emergence of the institution of Budjak *seraskerlik*s, see Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 198–200.
49. For the prohibition of slavery raids and return of slaves after the peace of Istanbul, see Abdülkadir Özcan, "Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa," in *Zübde-i Vek'ayiât, Tahlil ve Metin* (*1066–1116/1656–1704*) (Ankara, 1995), 695–97; ADVNSMHM 114, p. 261, verdict 1256, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey; ADVNSMHM 115, p. 144, verdict 59, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey. For the prohibitions after the war of Pruth, see ADVNSMHM 119, p. 37, verdict 249, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey.
50. Bartınlı İbrahim Hamdi, *Atlas-ı Cihan*, Esad Efendi 2044, folio 279a-279b, Library of Süleymaniye, Istanbul, Turkey; AE SMST III, 7395, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey; Başer, "Bucak Tatarları," 187–88.
51. Oleksandr Sereda, *XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Belgeleri Işığında Osmanlı-Ukrayna Bozkır Serhatti* (Odesa, 2015), 228–32.
52. The Kalmyk-Russian joint campaign of 1711 is a good example of this kind of attack, see Tepkeev, "Kalmytsko-krymskie otnosheniia," 39–40; for the Noghays' fear of these Kalmyk raids, see Çelebizâde İsmail Asım Efendi, *Târîh-ı Râşid ve Zeyli, Târîh-ı Çelebizâde*, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan et al. (Istanbul, 2013), 1603; for the life of Baht Giray, see Dmitrii Sen′, Vladislav Gribovskii, "Frontirnye elity i problema stabilizatsii granits Rossiiskoi i Osmanskoi imperii v pervoi treti XVIII v.: Deiatel′nost′

kubanskogo seraskera Bahty Gireja," *Ukraïna v tsentral'no-skhidnii Ievropi* 9–10 (2010): 193–226.

53. ADVNSMHM 133, p. 151, verdict 550, BOA, Istanbul, Turkey; Kochekaev, *Nogaisko-russkie otnosheniia*, 133.
54. Çelebizâde İsmail Asım Efendi, *Târîh-ı Çelebizâde*, 1589–91.
55. Tunmann, *Krymskoe khanstvo*, 49–66.
56. For a description of the 1756–1758 Noghay rebellion based on Turkish sources, see İsmail Bülbül, "Yedisan-Bucak Nogaylarının 1756 ve 1758 İsyanları," *Türk Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi Yıl* 1, no. 1 (2016): 74–112. For a narrative of the 1756–1758 Noghay rebellion based on Russian sources, see Kochekaev, *Nogaisko-russkie otnosheniia*, 142–60.
57. As a result of these efforts, a large number of clergy and scholars emerged in Noghay society; see Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, "Crimean and Noghay Scholars of the 18th Century," in *Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries*, ed. Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper, and Allen J. Frank (Berlin, 1996), 279–96.
58. "Lâkin ahâli-i Kırım ve Nogay ve taife-i Tatar sâirenin…kabâ'il-i Tatar yek-pâre daire-i itâ'atden hurûc eylemişdir" (But the people of Crimea and the Noghays and the other Tatar communities…all the Tatar tribes as one strayed from the circle of obedience), in Erhan Afyoncu, "Necati Efendi, Târih-i Kırım (Rusya Sefarenâmesi)" (master's thesis, University of Marmara, 1990), 2, 9, 15.
59. Alan Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of The Crimea, 1772–1783* (Cambridge, 1970), 35.