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The Nation in a Nutshell? Ukrainian Displaced Persons Camps in Postwar Germany*

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When the Allied Forces freed the territory of the German Reich in 1944 and 1945, they found themselves confronted with over ten million foreign civilians who had been displaced from their countries of origin. The overwhelming majority were forced laborers. The Allies intended to repatriate all these victims of Nazi Germany and therefore organized them by nationality.[1] However, two misconceptions in their approach to the problem soon proved troublesome. First, the number of people refusing repatriation was much higher than anyone had expected. Second, nationality was by no means congruent with citizenship—and it was the latter that was assumed as the basis for repatriation. The very existence of more than one hundred Ukrainian Displaced Persons camps in the western zones of occupied Germany was testament to the Ukrainian DPs' resistance to forced repatriation and their struggle for recognition of their nationality. This struggle with external actors was paralleled by internal processes that endeavored to spread, deepen, and foster national awareness within the national group. In this essay, I will analyze the actual mechanisms of nation building and how they shaped life in the DP camps. I argue that nation-building endeavors reached an exceptional intensity, albeit on the level of rather small communities, that was rooted in the historical situation.

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1. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum heimatlosen Ausländer: Die Displaced Persons in Westdeutschland, 1945–1951* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985), 24–25.

After explaining the historical context, I will analyze, in section 1, the conditions that made the DP camps particularly fertile for nation building. I will focus on the performative level in section 2, asking how nation building actually worked in the camps. Section 3 focuses on the content of the national historical narrative and how it bound Ukrainians together.

The spatial focus of this essay is mainly on the British zone of occupation, which is drastically underrepresented, even ignored, in secondary as well as primary literature.[2] The reason for this imbalance lies in the concentration of political actors and émigré circles in the U.S. zone of occupation, especially Bavaria. There one finds a mainly bipolar political discourse between the democratic camp and adherents of integral nationalism, as Volodymyr Kulyk has analyzed.[3] Yet, only a small intellectual minority engaged in these debates, which rarely had any impact on camp life and the majority of the Displaced Persons. The British zone of occupation remained particularly unaffected, owing to the comparably smaller scale of intellectual life. While national unity as promoted by most of the actors in the discourse failed in these ranks because of their political rivalry, ordinary men and women in the camps may have gained different experiences with nation building. This is the subject of this essay.

Before embarking on a discussion of nation building and national identity, it seems important to frame these terms. Nation building is a term that figuratively points to the constructivist understanding of what a nation is—it is to be built, like a house, by human beings, and therefore to be the product of a deliberate process of construction. It is not primordial. In response to the impossibility of finding a universal definition of what a nation is on the basis of culture, history, language, territory, religion, descent, and so on, constructivists depict a nation as group of people that defines itself as a nation.[4] These groups are usually connected by several of the aforementioned features. The

2. Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 555.

3. Volodymyr Kulyk, "The Role of Discourse in the Construction of an Émigré Community: Ukrainian Displaced Persons in Germany and Austria after the Second World War," in *European Encounters: Migrants, Migration and European Societies since 1945*, ed. Rainer Ohliger, Karen Schönwälder, and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003), 213–37.

4. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8. The influential scholars of nationalism Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner largely concur. See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson,

feeling of belonging evoked by sharing a certain set of features is then called national identity. However, Benedict Anderson's famous topos of nations as *imagined communities* must certainly not be mistaken for *imaginary* communities. Once in the world, national communities have proven to be the most powerful principles of order.

These principles were not fully implemented in Ukraine until 1991, and the nation-building process may still not be complete, as ongoing disputes over territory, language, and history imply. To use the terminology of Miroslav Hroch,[5] there can be no doubt that phases A and B of becoming a nation—the cultural construction and political activation of the concept of a Ukrainian nation—were achieved in the nineteenth century. I will argue in this essay that the third phase, the mobilization of the masses, was conducted under especially promising circumstances and with enormous vigor during the short period of the society *en miniature* in the DP camps.

One reason for the failure of the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917–1921 (hereafter UNR) was that it lacked the durability that might be offered by peasant support. Obviously, motives other than national ones had priority in the actions of the rural masses, who did not sacrifice themselves for Ukrainian statehood in the same way as the myths around Kruty and Bazar suggest that other social groups did. The next relatively successful attempt to nationalize the masses was made by the Soviet authorities. However, their Ukrainization campaign during the period of *korenizatsiia* (indigenization) was followed by a brutal, antinational rollback in the 1930s. During the Nazi occupation, Ukrainian national forces were used in some fields as anti-Soviet tools, and the different formations of Ukrainian nationalists gained *some* power in local governments and police forces. They immediately used this power to pursue their nationalizing project.[6] However, the attempt by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-"Banderites" (OUN-B) to create a sovereign Ukrainian state met with rejection and repression by the Germans. Even toward the end of the war, many people were still indifferent to national identifications, as Karel Berkhoff suggests.[7]

Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).

5. Miroslav Hroch, *Das Europa der Nationen: Die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich*, trans. Eližka and Ralph Melville (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005).

6. John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963; repr., Littleton, Colo.: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980), 90–91, 101–9. Citations refer to the Ukrainian Academic Press edition.

7. Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule*

When the tide of war finally turned against Germany, many Ukrainian military men, administrative officials, and other collaborators fled with the retreating Wehrmacht, together with nationalist activists, some clergymen, and others who feared Soviet reprisals.[8]

After the liberation of Germany, these refugees found themselves among two million Ukrainians in the western zones of occupation. About 90 percent of them went back to their homeland, many voluntarily and often for the simple reason of homesickness and in order to reunite with their families, while others were forced to do so by the Western powers following the Yalta Agreement.[9] Of the 200,000 Ukrainian DPs who remained in the western zones of Germany beyond 1945, 30 to 40 percent were refugees who had actively left their homeland in fear of Soviet rule; and the remainder were former slave laborers who had been imported by the Germans.[10]

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(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 230. In contrast, Bohdan Krawchenko (*Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* [Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1987], 168) argues that the brutal German regime led to an increase in national identification, whereas John Barber and Mark Harrison (*The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in World War II* [London: Longman, 1991]) claim that it made Soviet citizens unite around Stalin.

8. Jan-Hinnerk Antons, "Flucht ins 'Dritte Reich': Wie Osteuropäer Schutz im NS-Staat suchten (1943–1945)," *Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History* 14, no. 2 (2017): 231–57, http://dx.doi.org/10.14765/zzf.dok.4.968; Orest Subtelny, "Ukrainian Political Refugees: An Historical Overview," in *The Refugee Experience: Ukrainian Displaced Persons after World War II*, ed. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Yury Boshyk, and Roman Senkus (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1992), 3–20.

9. The literature on the forced repatriation, especially works from the Cold War period, tends to overestimate the need to use force. See Nikolai Tolstoy, *Victims of Yalta* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978); Mark R. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta: Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1982); Julius Epstein, *Operation Keelhaul: The Story of Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present* (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair, 1974). Contemporary witnesses speak of a higher percentage of voluntary repatriation. See Bohdan Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day: The Reminiscences of Bohdan Panchuk*, ed. Lubomyr Y. Luciuk (Toronto: Multicultural History Society; Ontario Heritage Foundation, 1983), 70. For detailed discussion of (forced) repatriation from the British zone, see Jan-Hinnerk Antons, *Ukrainische Displaced Persons in der britischen Zone: Lagerleben zwischen nationaler Fixierung und pragmatischen Zukunftsentwürfen* (Essen: Klartex, 2014), 66–83.

10. Marta Dyczok, *The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 77.

Right from the beginning, that is, after their liberation, Ukrainians who refused to be repatriated organized camps along national categories, claimed their recognition as a separate nationality, and protested against forced repatriation. Afraid of confronting their Eastern ally, the Western powers did not officially recognize a Ukrainian nationality, but they did start to set up purely Ukrainian DP camps, where they listed the inhabitants as *stateless*, *undetermined,* or just *others*.[11] The reasons for this were, first, that they feared their negative influence on the general motivation to repatriate, especially on Polish DPs,[12] and, second, that simply too many conflicts were arising between Ukrainians and Poles in mixed camps.[13] When forced repatriation ceased in 1946 and the camps developed into more or less stable communities, Ukrainian activists directed all their energies at their own community. The nationalization drive intensified, and political conflicts that had been covered up by a truce between opposing parties in 1945 resurfaced. Some scholars speak in this regard of a great rift in the Ukrainian postwar diaspora.[14] And, indeed, the parties in the Ukrainian National Rada, the parliament in exile of the UNR that was reestablished in 1948 in Augsburg, Bavaria, spent their time in endless squabbling, without ever moving beyond symbolic meaning. However, these parties had fewer than two hundred members each,[15] and they had no impact on or even visibility

11. Memorandum concerning the separate listing of Ukrainian DPs, 11 March 1947, Files of the Control Office for Germany and Austria and Foreign Office: Control Commission for Germany (British Element) Prisoners of War/Displaced Persons Division (hereafter COGA[BE] PW/DP): Ukrainian Displaced Persons (DPs), 1946–1947, FO 1052/364, The National Archives London (hereafter TNA); 470 UNRRA Field Supervisor to Director of UNRRA Team 11, 9 November 1946, Fonds of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (hereafter UNRRA), S-0429-0006-01, United Nations Archives (hereafter UNA).

12. Memorandum of Prisoners of War/Displaced Persons Division (PWDP-Div.) BAOR (British Army of the Rhine), 2 August 1946, COGA(BE) PW/DP: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, FO 1052/364, TNA.

13. Ibid.

14. Volodymyr Maruniak, *Ukraïns´ka emigratsiia v Nimechchyni i Avstriï po druhii svitovii viini*, vol. 1, *Roky 1945–1951* (Munich: Akademichne vydavnytstvo P. Beleia, 1985), 269; Lubomyr Y. Luciuk, *Searching for Place: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, Canada and the Migration of Memory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 88–90; Myroslav Yurkevich, "Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics, 1945–50," in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 125–43; Theodore Bohdan Ciuciura, "Common Organizational Efforts, 1945–52: Structure and People," in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 90–108.

15. For Ukrainian political parties in postwar Germany, see Maruniak, *Ukraïns´ka emigratsiia*, 239–42; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 315–16; Frank Golczewski, "Die ukrainische Diaspora nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg," in *Geschichte der Ukraine*, ed.

in everyday life in the DP camps. The only political organization that was of any quantitative importance, the OUN-B, with its roughly 5,000 members in postwar Germany, did not take part permanently in the UNRada.[16] It stuck to its ideological claim to have the exclusive right to represent the entire Ukrainian nation and thus caused the political disruption. Following this polarization, many social organizations existed in two versions: one pro-Banderite and one anti-Banderite. There were two associations of journalists, political prisoners, veterans, students, Scouts, and so on.[17] In spite of the split, however, there was great unity on central questions, such as whether Ukrainians formed a distinct nation and what the constitutive elements of this nation should be. The Ukrainian DPs were furthermore united by common aims. These were, in the short run, to gain recognition as a national group from the Western Allies and thus prevent forced repatriation and, in the long run, to free Ukraine from both Soviet and Russian rule.

The spirit of cooperation in the early DP period became most visible in the creation of the Central Representation of the Ukrainian Emigration in Germany (Tsentral´ne Predstavnytstvo Ukraïns´koï Emihratsiï v Nimechchyni, TsPUEN) in 1945 under Vasyl´ Mudryi in Munich, Bavaria. It was a joint project of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (Ukraïns´ke Natsional´no-Demokratychne Ob'iednannia, UNDO), OUN-B, OUN-M (Melnykites), and the Hetmanist forces.[18] In terms of nationalizing the community, these groups concurred with the powerful OUN-B even beyond 1945. Nevertheless, Bandera and his followers engaged in uncompromising power politics, activated clandestine structures,[19] and quickly gained power in the self-administration of most of the DP camps, using their authority in a dictatorial manner.[20] Due to the concentration of intellectuals in the U.S. zone, the OUN-B,

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Frank Golczewski (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 261–68; Vasyl Markus, "Political Parties in the DP Camps," in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 111–24.

16. Vasyl Markus, "Political Parties," 114.

17. Maruniak, *Ukraïns´ka emigratsiia*, 239. Some organizations may have been set up as ends in themselves with the goal of obtaining a position, as Mr. Syprun confirmed in an interview. Mr. Syprun, interview by Jan-Hinnerk Antons, 18 January 2010, transcript, p. 7, Private Archives of Jan-Hinnerk Antons (hereafter PAJHA). All interviewees and correspondents who shared personal memories appear under pseudonyms.

18. Golczewski, "Die ukrainische Diaspora," 262.

19. For a firsthand account, see Stefan Petelycky, *Into Auschwitz, for Ukraine* (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 1999).

20. An UNRRA report regarded the Ukrainian self-administrations in general as highly problematic, "inclined to a certain degree of dictatorship." "History of UNRRA Team 252," 11, UNRRA, S-1021-0084-03, UNA.

Figure 1. UPA Donation receipt, confiscated at the Lysenko DP camp in Hannover in January 1947. "Lyssenko-History," United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) fonds (AG-018), S-1021-0084-04, United Nations Archives.

with its working class and peasant followers,[21] was especially strong in the British zone of occupation. Besides holding official positions, they ruled the community by their established strategies of clandestine intimidation and violence. Donation requests in support of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) serve as a good example. The UNRRA director of the Lysenko camp in Hannover described the proceedings: "Persons, names of whom we do not know, who are supposed to belong to an underground Ukrainian Movement called the 'Bandura Army' [*sic*], are from time to time circulating the a/n camp [Lysenko], soliciting for money among the camp population. This happened four times in the last eighteen months, last time a few weeks ago. When people are contributing money, they are issued with obligations or bonds....Of those who refuse to pay, names are taken by collectors. Through such action the people are scared and in our opinion this illegal action should be stopped at once."[22] (See fig. 1, above.)

In the British zone, these kinds of donation receipts were found in

21. Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 557.

22. Report by the Director of UNRRA Team 252 to the Commander of 112 R-Det., 9 January 1947, COGA(BE) PW/DP: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, FO 1052/365, TNA;

DP camps in Goslar, Eversheide, Bielefeld, Bathorn, Minden, Osnabrück and Hannover.[23] In this strategy, the OUN-B drew on similar fundraising campaigns in interwar Galicia, which Franziska Bruder calls *Zwangsbesteuerung* (coercive taxation).[24] Here, it was an addendum to the taxation of the TsPUEN.[25] Connecting what Vasyl´ Sofroniv Levtys´kyi has called the "DP camp republics"[26] at a supra-camp level were the TsPUEN, the UNRada, and taxation by the OUN-B. Moreover, the Ukrainian community in the western zones of Germany interacted through a variety of newspapers that enabled intercamp and interzonal discourses—through the exchange of cultural and political emissaries, by unifying Ukrainian cooperatives in a countrywide body, by attempts to create an émigré juridical structure, and by a great range of civil society organizations.[27] These structures, however, mainly affected the better-educated DPs.

1. Hothouses of Nation Building

The preconditions for working toward a fully nationalized Ukrainian community had rarely been better than in the Ukrainian Displaced Persons camps. As though in a hothouse, national identity found a stimulating growth environment. Below, I present the seven most important reasons.

First, when one speaks about the preconditions for fostering, deepening, or awakening national awareness in the DP camps, one must take into account the composition of the group. The people who had a reason to stay in the western zones of occupation were those who feared Soviet

Commandant of Eversheide DP Camp to UNRRA Team 242, 11 September 1946, COGA(BE) PW/DP: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, FO 1052/365, TNA.

23. R-Det. 112 to PWDP, Land Niedersachsen Branch, "Illegal Activities of Ukrainian Displaced Persons," COGA(BE) PW/DP: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, FO 1052/365, TNA; "Lyssenko-History," UNRRA, S-1021-0084-04, UNA.

24. Franziska Bruder, *"Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!": Die Organisation Ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948* (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 78.

25. Regarding the TsPUEN taxation, see Nicholas G. Bohatiuk, "The Economic Aspects of Camp Life," in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 69–89, here 79.

26. Vasyl´ Sofroniv Levyts´kyi, *Respublika za drotamy (zapysky skytal´tsia)* (Toronto: Novyi shliakh, 1983).

27. For a discussion of the question whether the Ukrainian DP communities formed any kind of a society, see Jan-Hinnerk Antons, "Displaced Persons in Post-War Germany: Parallel Societies in a Hostile Environment," *Journal of Contemporary History* 49, no. 1 (January 2014): 92–114.

repression because of their political activity, their social status, or the mere fact that they had been in Germany. The last point in particular involved a certain degree of understanding of the Soviet system and the solely propagandistic character of its repatriation campaign promises. Then there were those who had already experienced Soviet repression, and, finally, there were those who had just fled the advance of the Red Army. Ukrainians who were indifferent to the national movement or had pro-Soviet convictions were more likely to be among the 90 percent who went home after their liberation. Conversely, the Displaced Persons who refused repatriation may be seen as a positive preselection in terms of anti-Soviet convictions and national consciousness. For Ukrainians who had held Soviet citizenship before 1 September 1939, the refusal to be repatriated included taking active steps to avoid forced repatriation. The most common one was to modify their identity from eastern to western Ukrainian by choosing a birthplace in prewar Poland, the Greek Catholic confession, and, if necessary, a family name that did not arouse suspicion. In addition to "losing" documents and finding witnesses for the new identity, this could be done by forging new documents with the help of OUN-B networks and the self-declared Ukrainian Red Cross, which operated out of Geneva.[28]

Second, eastern Ukrainians who had stayed in the West for reasons other than national (that is, political, social, personal, or economic reasons) also had to avoid forced repatriation and therefore denied their Russian or Soviet identities. Claiming Ukrainian nationality was a reasonable way to highlight anti-Soviet victim status.

Third, the German policy of *divide et impera* (for instance, treating Ukrainian POWs of the Red Army slightly better than their Russian comrades) had promoted non-Russian national identification. Toward the end of the war, even the *Ostarbeiter* in the Reich were given patches with national emblems, in order to gain their support for a postulated all-European, anti-Bolshevik struggle.

Fourth, as ethnographic diaspora research shows, exile situations

28. Viacheslav Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokiv: Z nezakinchenoho litopysu," *Al´manakh Ukraïns´koho Narodnoho Soiuzu* (Jersey City, N.J.) 61 (1971): 141–55, here 149; Panchuk, *Heroes of Their Day*, 67; Correspondence of Senior Russian Liaison Officer for Repatriation, 21st Army Group Lt. Col. Melnikov, with Chief of Military Government, 21st Army Group Major General Templer, July 1945, COGA German Section/General Department: Soviet Nationals: Repatriation of Dissident Displaced Persons, FO 945/598, TNA.

and uncertainty about the future in general stimulate concern about heritage and belonging.[29]

Fifth, the impossibility of finding work in most of the DP camps, in combination with guaranteed food supplies, provided DPs with plenty of leisure time to occupy themselves with intellectual questions.[30] Many cultural activities connected with national identity benefited from this fact.

Sixth, for the first time in Ukrainian history, a population had evolved that was ethnically homogenous, but at the same time displayed the regional, confessional, and social diversity of the whole country.[31] This is what may be called a "nation in a nutshell." One must take into account, however, that a preselection in ethnic and political terms had taken place. Jews, Russians, *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans), and other national minorities were hardly to be found in the Ukrainian camps. The same was true for communists.

And seventh, for the first time in its history, the OUN-B gained an opportunity to govern a Ukrainian community in more or less stable conditions and to implement its political programs.

This last point hints at a key element of Bohdan Krawchenko's general, more structuralist factors determining successful nation building: "The active intervention of indigenous elites, the existence of a mobilised population and of infrastructures of national life tolerated by the central state are, in our view, among the most important elements facilitating the emergence of a national consciousness."[32] The DP population was indeed very much mobilized, not only in spatial terms, but in social as well.[33] The Western Allies, who represented the central state for the DP camps until 1950, also tolerated infrastructures of national life, such as schools, press, camp self-administration, etc. In view of these congruencies, the favorable conditions for nation building were

29. Susanne Lachenicht and Kirsten Heinsohn, eds., *Diaspora Identities: Exile, Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Past and Present* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2009); Kim D. Butler, "Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse," *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 10, no. 2 (Fall 2001), 189–219; Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan, and Carolin Alfonso, eds., *Diaspora, Identity and Religion: New Directions in Theory and Research*, Routledge Research in Transnationalism 14 (London: Routledge, 2004).

30. See Kulyk, "Role of Discourse," 231.

31. See Ihor V. Zielyk, "The DP Camp as a Social System," in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 461–70, here 464.

32. Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness*, xix.

33. Zielyk, "DP Camp as a Social System," 463; Antons, *Ukrainische Displaced Persons*, 314–32, 376.

no longer connected to individual experiences and thus constituted a special historical situation.

2. Nationalizing Camp Life

The circumstance whereby nationalist activists ran the DP camp self-administrations—i.e., the intervention of an indigenous elite—is an ideal starting point from which to scrutinize the nation-building endeavors. It highlights the fact that the nationalizing of the community was not only a self-actuating process fueled by the first six reasons, but also a deliberate act by a group of nationalist activists. The term "nationalist" is not meant to indicate OUN membership here, but stands for the prioritization of the national over all other affiliations (social, religious, occupational, regional, sexual, etc.).

The intention to nationalize the communities is illustrated by a meeting of Ukrainian commanders of DP camps in the British zone called in November 1945 to coordinate their work. In addition to the official group leaders of individual camps, a number of leading figures from the OUN-B were also in attendance.[34] They discussed the school system, finances, and, most importantly for our case, cultural life in the DP camps. Their resolution stated: "Art and literature to be brought under national organization and control.…The Church is to be recognized as an essential factor in Ukrainian life and a focus of national unity.… Intensive training of youth, with appeal to Ukrainian tradition."[35]

Subsequent points read like detailed instructions for nationalizing everyday life in the camps: "Special stress is to be laid this year on the marking of Christmas, in view of its national as well as its religious significance. Intercamp relationships are to be encouraged, also such things as a camp press, radio and cultural centers, these last to be made attractive with pictures of Ukrainian heroes, etc."[36]

Even Christmas had a primarily national, and only secondarily religious meaning here. In this and many other acts of the camp self-administrations, especially in the field of cultural policy, one rediscov-

34. The participants of the meeting were Pavlo Lysiak, Myron Luts´kyi, Khoma Riabokin´, Zenon Pelens´kyi, Volodymyr Ianiv, Roman Spol´s´kyi, Andrii Palii, Oleksandr Drozdovs´kyi, and some unknown delegates from the Heidenau camp. See Resolution of the meeting (English translation), November 1945, COGA(BE) Political Division: Ukrainian and Baltic Refugees: Policy on Treatment and Repatriation, FO 1049/652, TNA.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.

ers the strategies that the OUN-B applied in order to nationalize the peasant masses in Ukraine before and during the Second World War.[37] Symbolism was very important. In every camp, residents erected a huge *tryzub* (trident, Ukraine's national emblem) in a central location, and raised a Ukrainian flag at the camp entrance, where the British or Americans did not intervene. Another symbolic act was to name camps after national heroes like Bohdan Khmel´nyts´kyi (Heidenau) or the composer Mykola Lysenko (Hannover).

Cultural activities in general flourished in the DP camps. In the Ukrainian case, they were almost exclusively concerned with traditional folklore, with the sole exception of the cinema. The cultural repertoire was fused to national heritage ensembles through repetition in everyday life. The task at hand was to preserve Ukrainian culture and values for the next generations and an independent state. To the untiring amateur groups engaged in activities like singing, dancing, and embroidery, engagement with traditions was an important act of self-reassurance. As Viacheslav Davydenko, a former inhabitant of the Heidenau DP camp, put it retrospectively: "Він далеко був від нас, наш великий народ. Але кусничок був з нами. І те, що було вдома звичайним, самозрозумілим, на що вдома ми не звертали уваги—багато-хто з нас навчився як слід цінити лише в таборі, відчувши себе порошиною" (It was far away from us, our great nation. Yet, a part of it was with us. And what had been ordinary and self-explanatory, which we did not pay attention to at home—many of us learned to value only in the camp, having felt ourselves to be a speck of dust).[38]

The preoccupation with cultural traditions not only offered an emotional foothold to the DPs, it also prevented them from sinking into apathy, which aid organizations observed in some other cases.[39] Echoing their reports, Jacobmeyer even claimed that "the loss of social and personal identity" was characteristic of Displaced Persons history.[40] This did not seem to apply to Ukrainian DPs, first because of their less traumatic experiences, in comparison with Jewish DPs, for example, and second, the nationalist charging of camp life.

With few exceptions, professional artists also dealt with traditional

37. Bruder, *"Den ukrainischen Staat,"* 144.

38. Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokiv," 148.

39. "Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons: A Report Prepared for the Welfare Division of the European Regional Office of UNRRA by an Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group," June 1945, UNRRA, S-1304-0000-0257, UNA.

40. Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, "The 'Displaced Persons' in West Germany, 1945–1951," in *The Uprooted: Forced Migration as an International Problem in the Post-War Era*, ed. Göran Rystad (Lund: Lund University Press, 1990), 271–88, here 286.

repertoires.[41] For instance, the vibrant camp theaters that toured throughout the British and American zones mainly staged classical Ukrainian plays of the nineteenth century. In contrast, Jewish DP theaters dealt with the sufferings of Nazi victims to such a degree that UNRRA personnel called it "obsessive remembering."[42] Thus, they played an active role in reflecting on the events of the Second World War. When Ukrainian theaters did the same, their plays focused on the ongoing struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, but did not deal with the experiences of forced laborers, for example.[43]

Interestingly, traditional organizations promoting national cultural life, like Prosvita, seemed to lose their raison d'être when nationalists ran the cultural departments of camp administrations. In Heidenau, the OUN-B stronghold in the British zone, a local Prosvita branch was not established until November 1946. In its first declaration, it apologized for causing a duplication of effort and emphasized that it would not be a competitor, but had a strong will to unite the nation. The organization was presented as a tradition worth preserving in and of itself.[44]

Churches, as undisputed moral authorities, were key to nation building. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (Ukraïns´ka Hreko-Katolyts´ka Tserkva, UHKTs) of Western Ukraine had always defended Ukrainian identity against Polonization. On the Orthodox side, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (Ukraïns´ka Avtokefal´na Pravoslavna Tserkva, UAPTs) was the dominant element. Driven by nationalist feeling among Ukrainians, it had been reestablished as a strictly national church in 1941–1942[45] and was divorced from any connection with Russia whatsoever; all twelve of its bishops fled to Germany toward the end of the war.[46] Metropolitan Polikarp (Sikors´kyi)

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41. Valerian Revutsky, "Theatre in the Camps," in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 292–310, here 293.
42. Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 197.
43. "'U shtabi UPA,'" *Ranok*, no. 47, 19 November 1949, 4. Copy from the DP camps collection (hereafter Taborova kolektsiia), Archive of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich (Ukraïns´kyi Vil´nyi Universytet, hereafter UVU). Further citations of this periodical refer to copies from this collection.
44. "Zasnovannia chytal´ni Prosvity," *Nasha poshta*, no. 7, 24 November 1946, 3. Copy from Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence, 1906–1966: Ukrainian Refugees and Displaced Persons, FO 371/56793, TNA.
45. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 198–99.
46. Reinhard Thoele, *Orthodoxe Kirchen in Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997), 58; see also A. Zhukovsky, "Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 5, ed. Danylo Husar Struk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 352.

Figure 2. Archbishop Buchko and Metropolitan Polikarp embracing. DP camp Heidenau, 1948. Private collection of Mr. Iavorivs´kyi.

of the UAPTs took up residency at the DP camp in Heidenau (see fig. 2, above).[47]

What Alexander Baran stated regarding the Ukrainian Catholic Church in his essay could be said for both: each was generally "an important national institution and a moral authority that constantly influenced their [the DPs'] political, social, and cultural existence."[48] Visitations by high-ranking clerical figures were important events for the DPs, and they never took place without nationally inspired proclamations. Dignitaries were honored not only for their religious importance, but also for their national significance, as in the greetings wishing Mykola Voiakovs´kyi, Apostolic Visitor of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, a return to Lviv to celebrate divine services at St. George's Cathedral[49] or that Metropolitan Polikarp might return to

47. Heidenau DP camp entry list, Lagerbuch II, p. 40, TOS-03-32-001, Samtgemeindearchiv Tostedt (Joint Municipality Archive, Tostedt, hereafter SGAT); Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokiv," 153.
48. Alexander Baran, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church," in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 147–57, here 147.
49. Greeting by the Lysenko camp priest Semen Ïzhyk, *Biuleten´ taboru im. M. Lysenka*, no. 317, 13 September 1946. Copy from the Displaced Persons Camps in Austria and

the homeland, enter St. Sophia's Cathedral, and pray for the rebirth of the Ukrainian state.[50] In 1948 Ivan Buchko, who succeeded Voiakovs´kyi, toured the DP camps, where he was welcomed by religious rallies attended by all Ukrainians, regardless of their confession, as the weekly newspaper *Ukraïns´ke slovo* from Heidenau reported.[51] In his pastoral letter, Buchko sought to give meaning to the fate of the Ukrainian Displaced Persons by ascribing to them an anticommunist mission.[52] He claimed that their historic task was to open the eyes of Westerners to the evil of the Soviet Union.

The national framing of religious life led Anglo-Ukrainian visitors to postwar Germany to comment favorably, indeed enthusiastically, on the "wonderful spirit of harmony, cooperation and understanding that exists between the two Ukrainian churches."[53] And indeed, the two churches shared facilities in many camps that could not provide enough space for two churches.[54] There were also biconfessional marriages.[55] Most important, however, were the joint activities featuring national characteristics. Every national holiday (see below) was framed by services conducted by clergymen of both churches, and with the creation of Heroes' Day (*Sviato Heroïv*), a new national holiday was established to honor the heroes killed in the struggle for independence.[56] As a for-

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Germany papers, Archives of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, New York (hereafter SSS).

50. "V den´ Anhela Mytropolyta Polikarpa," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 66, 7 August 1949, 2; "Vshannuvannia Mytropolyta UAPTs Polikarpa v tabori Haidenav," *Svitanok*, no. 2, 11 August 1948, 4. Both periodicals are housed in the Taborova kolektsiia, UVU; further citations refer to copies from this collection.

51. "Pryïzd Ioho Ekstselentsiï Vpreosviashchennoho Kyr Ivana Buchka," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 2, 9 May 1948, 1.

52. Bernadetta Wojtowicz, *Geschichte der Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche in Deutschland vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis 1956*, Schriften zur Geistesgeschichte des östlichen Europa 21 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2000), 174. For the original statement, see Ivan Buchko, *Vybrani poslannia arkhyiepyskopa Ivana Buchka, arkhypastyria skytal´tsiv u 100-richchia ioho narodzhennia: 1891–1 zhovtnia, 1991* (Rome: Vydavnytstvo oo. Vasyliian, 1991), 14.

53. Bohdan Panchuk, Report from Germany no. 3/46 to CURB, UCRF, and UUARC, 12 March 1946, p. 1, Bohdan Panchuk Fonds, box 17, F1417/3, Archives of Ontario. See also S. P. Symchych, "Spomyny zo skytal´shchyny," *Kaliendar "Ukraïns´koho Holosu"* (Winnipeg) 30 (1947): 76.

54. Panchuk, Report from Germany no. 3/46, p. 1; see also newspaper clipping "Keine Furcht mehr vor Heidenau" (No fear of Heidenau anymore), without source and date, *Schulchronik Heidenau* (School chronicle of Heidenau), SGAT.

55. Resolution of Lysenko DP camp residents, 21 December 1946, UNRRA, S-0409-0014-10, UNA.

56. The initiative is said to have come from the OUN(B) in 1941. See "Sviato Heroïv,"

mer resident of the Heidenau DP camp recalls, “Sviato Heroïv used to be primarily an annual religious remembrance occasion for the fallen soldiers of the First World War, i.e., USS, and of the UNR. In Heidenau there were numerous veterans of those conflicts, who, in coordination with the two dominant churches, initiated these occasions.”[57]

However, the national unity of the churches had narrow limits. Competing Orthodox groupings, first and foremost the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church (Ukraïns´ka Avtonomna Pravoslavna Tserkva), had already been fought by the UPA during the war,[58] and they continued to be excluded in the DP camps. Orthodox churches other than the UAPTs were accused of being unpatriotic and successfully banned from many camps.[59] In Hannover, the Lysenko Camp, the largest Ukrainian camp in the British zone and the only one with an Orthodox majority, was almost split up because of these quarrels. To defuse the tense situation, in 1948 the British banned the schismatic archbishop Hryhorii Ohiichuk from any religious activities for six months. The conflict, however, was not between eastern Ukrainians and Galicians, as the British authorities supposed at first, but was caused by interwoven regional, religious, and political affiliations. In part, the fight, which turned physical more than once, was caused by the OUN-B’s attempts to gain control over the camp.[60] As a result, the Orthodox opposition was moved out of the camp, and elements of the UAPTs left the church and founded/revived the “UAPTs of 1921,” or the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church–Conciliar (Ukraïns´ka Avtokefal´na Pravoslavna Tserkva–Sobornopravna, UAPTs–S), which shared national convictions, but opposed the undemocratic structures and Polikarp’s rule.[61] While there was indeed religious unity between Catholics and Orthodox

Lviv State University of Physical Culture (L´vivs´kyi derzhavnyi universytet fizychnoï kul´tury), accessed 13 December 2018, http://www.ldufk.edu.ua/index.php/svjato-gerojiv.html.

57. Mr. Iavorivs´kyi to Jan-Hinnerk Antons, 4 May 2011, PAJHA.

58. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 244; Friedrich Heyer, *Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine: Von 1917 bis 1945* (Cologne: R. Müller, 1953), 219. The most blatant act in this context was the murder of the “autonomous” exarch Aleksii by nationalist guerrillas on 7 May 1943.

59. I. M., “Znamenni vybory,” *Svitanok*, no. 1, 28 July 1948, 3–4; Memorandum of Religious Affairs Branch, PWDP-Div. BAOR, 6 December 1948, COGA(BE) PW/DP: Spiritual Welfare: Liaison with Ukrainian Autocephal [*sic*] Orthodox Church, FO 1052/210, TNA.

60. For a detailed discussion, see Antons, *Ukrainische Displaced Persons*, 234–42.

61. Maruniak, *Ukraïns´ka emigratsiia*, 311; for a detailed discussion of the split, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, “The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in West Germany, 1945–50,” in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 158–81.

insofar as they followed the same nationalist path, clearly there was sharp conflict between different Orthodox groups. The German Protestant Church observed that their parishes lived distinctly apart from each other and without any community.[62] Individuals who remained with other branches of the Orthodox Church were at times even physically assaulted, especially during holidays like Easter, when people got drunk.[63] In Falkenberg, near Hamburg, for instance, an "autonomous" priest was attacked with knives and brass knuckles, until the British military police intervened.[64]

Another important factor in nation building was—and still is—the national language. In central and eastern Ukrainian cities many people spoke Russian and looked down on Ukrainian as an uncivilized language of the rural population.[65] Although the German occupiers had introduced Ukrainian as an official language, it never became a single national language, and was always undermined by a diversity of languages in everyday life. Many potential Ukrainians in the DP camps were at least bilingual, as UNRRA DP-registration cards show.[66] Nevertheless, languages other than Ukrainian were successfully banned from official camp life—that is, from administration, periodicals, and churches. If people chose to continue to speak Russian in private, they were often denounced as *moskali* (Muscovites, or Russians) and ostracized from the community. A former resident of the Heidenau camp remembers: "Although my father and mother were born in Eastern Ukraine and spoke Ukrainian, they chose to speak Russian because that is what they spoke before. Right from the beginning we were disliked by the Ukrainians who almost all belonged to the Bandera organization.…Because my father spoke Russian he was looked upon as a non-Ukrainian, maybe a sympathizer with Communist Russia."[67]

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62. Letter from the Protestant Church of Germany to all its regional churches, 16 March 1949, Landeskirchenamt: Generalakten (Regional Church Office: General Files), B1/6847, vol. 2, Landeskirchliches Archiv Hannover (Regional Church Archives, Hannover) (LKAH).
63. Mrs. Dwyer (former resident of Heidenau DP camp) to Jan-Hinnerk Antons, 31 March 2012, PAJHA.
64. "Hanebnyi napad na sviashchenyka," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 60, 26 June 1949, 4. Heyer locates the same or similar incident in the nearby Fischbek DP camp. See Heyer, *Die orthodoxe Kirche*, 225.
65. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, 194.
66. Polish, Russian, and German were declared as the most frequently used languages. See fond of DP-2 cards, Registrierung und Betreuung von DPs innerhalb und außerhalb von Lagern (Registration and care of DPs inside and outside of camps), 3.1.1.1, Archives of the International Tracing Service (hereafter ITS).
67. Dwyer to Antons, 31 March 2012, PAJHA.

The Ukrainian camp administrations tried not only to suppress Russian and Polish, but also to spread the Ukrainian language by organizing classes.[68] Because illiteracy was a widespread phenomenon—it was thought that 45 percent of the adult population of the Dorsten DP camp was illiterate[69]—literacy courses promoted by UNRRA and IRO (International Refugee Organization) as well as volunteers were a useful vehicle. The path to literacy was a path to national identity—as the Soviets had demonstrated during the *korenizatsiia* campaign in the 1920s.[70]

The Ukrainian camp press and administrations were outraged by Polish DP camp administrations that ostensibly forbade the use of Ukrainian in their camps,[71] yet followed the same pattern of denial and suppression of other languages. On the one hand, this highlights the importance of language in nation building. On the other, the existing bilingualism demonstrates an ambiguity in language, which intrinsically disqualifies it as a criterion for defining a nation.

Another crucial instrument for nationalizing people is the education system. It not only preselects the language in which educated people talk to each other, but also determines the content of group identities. In the case of the Ukrainian DPs, education became especially important for conveying national traditions, values, and attributes to the next generation and preserving them for a future independent state. To guarantee the future existence of a nation, it is not only necessary to teach national content, but also to induce the will to recognize the nation as a most valuable asset. This had been done for decades in schools in Western Ukraine. There, education was also a means for the rural Ukrainian population to climb the social ladder and compete with the urban Jewish and Polish populations, and was an important

68. For the Rautheimerstraße DP camp in Braunschweig, see report of the city refugee administration, 3 January 1953, Ministerium für Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten: Ausländische Flüchtlinge, Displaced Persons (DP's) (Ministry of Federal and European Affairs: Foreign Refugees, Displaced Persons), Nds. 380 Acc. 62/65 Nr. 700, Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover (Central State Archives, Hannover) (HStAH).

69. "Rokovyny odnoho taboru," *Luna*, no. 34, 6 October 1946, 3. Taborova kolektsiia, UVU. Further citations of this periodical refer to copies from this collection.

70. Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness*, 134–35.

71. TsPUEN to the Ministry of Social Affairs of North Rhine-Westphalia, 5 October 1950, Arbeits- und Sozialministerium/ Flüchtlingswesen (Ministry of Labor and Welfare/Refugee Affairs), NW 67, Nr. 1384, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen (Archives of North Rhine-Westphalia) (LANRW). See also Maruniak, *Ukraïns´ka emigratsiia*, 148.

step toward national self-reliance. Thus, education became part of the national project.

Schools in the Ukrainian DP camps were modeled on the school system of interwar Galicia, consisting of a four-year primary school and an eight-year academic secondary school (gymnasium) for the future elite. A central curriculum was developed by the education department of the TsPUEN,[72] headed by Dmytro Doroshenko, the well-known historian and former Hetmanist official. In the British zone, the former director of the Przemyśl girls' high school,[73] Stepan Bobelak, was put in charge of establishing a standardized school system. He did not report to the TsPUEN, but to the Ukrainian Central Relief/Advisory Committee (Ukraïns´kyi Tsentral´nyi Dopomohovyi/Doradchyi Komitet, UTsDK), the accredited representative body of Ukrainians in the British zone of occupation. Thus, TsPUEN's reach in this field, as in most others, was limited to the U.S. zone. The schools in the British zone collaborated closely with the Ukrainian Scout organization Plast and the churches. Classes attended national commemorations led by their teachers, and children who did poorly in school were suspended from Plast activities. Plast members even decorated the classrooms with patriotic paintings and slogans (see fig. 3, below).

In its ideology, Plast was thoroughly nationalist. The primary duty of every member was "Бути вірним Богові і Україні" (To be faithful to God and Ukraine), and the organization saw itself as an important part of the national struggle for independence: "В наших тяжких національних змаганнях Пласт мав, має і буде мати своє поважне місце" (Plast had, has, and will have its worthy place in our difficult national struggle).[74] In the OUN-B-affiliated youth organization known as the Ukrainian Youth Association (Spilka Ukraïns´koï Molodi, SUM), Plast found a more militant competitor, established in July 1946.[75] In contrast to SUM's claim to represent all young Ukrainians, Plast highlighted its nonpartisan stance. This lack of affiliation with a political party has sometimes been misunderstood as an apolitical stance. Plast was, however, a highly political organization that was above party politics. It had a long tradition in the shaping of a whole generation of

72. Maruniak, *Ukraïns´ka emigratsiia*, 157; Daria Markus, "Education in the DP Camps," in Isajiw, Boshyk, and Senkus, *Refugee Experience*, 185–200, here 188.
73. CM1-file Stepan Bobelak, IRO "Care and Maintenance" Program, 3.2.1, doc. no. 78946264, ITS.
74. "Ukraïns´kyi Plast i ioho zavdannia," *Tyzhneva poshta*, no. 5, 15 September 1946, 1–2. Copy from the Displaced Persons Camps in Austria and Germany papers, SSS.
75. Yurkevich, "Ukrainian Nationalists and DP Politics," 136.

Figure 3. Classroom with Plast slogan. Taras Shevchenko Gymnasium in Heidenau. Private collection of Mr. Iavorivs´kyi.

nationalist activists in Western Ukraine,[76] and it clung to its role as a school of the nation in the DP camps. In 1948 there were 197 active Plast groups in the western zones of Germany.[77] However, according to Volodymyr Maruniak, SUM was even more widespread, representing 18 percent of all Ukrainian youth in Germany, whereas Plast had only 10 percent in its ranks.[78] The membership rate of 28 percent for young people in these organizations underlines the success of national mobilization in the camps.

Schools probably played an even more important role in conveying national consciousness and patriotism because they reached all children between the ages of 6 and 14.[79] Mrs. Lindley, a former pupil at the Taras

76. See Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929,* East European Monographs 65 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1980), 140; Anton Shekhovtsov, "By Cross and Sword: 'Clerical Fascism' in Interwar Western Ukraine," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2 (June 2007): 271–85, here 278.

77. Maruniak, *Ukraïns´ka emigratsiia*, 279.

78. Ibid, 357.

79. The TsPUEN regarded school attendance as compulsory at this age, and individual camp regulations complied. Markus, "Education," 188; "Lager-Regulament [*sic*]" Lysenko (Lysenko DP camp rules), §5, UNRRA, S-1021-0084-03, UNA.

Shevchenko Gymnasium in Heidenau, remembers her teacher's history curriculum:

> The Greeks, the Kievan kingdom on the great river Dnipro. He tells us about Olga, Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise, how they took on Christianity and brought it to Ukraine from Constantinople. He told us about the Tartars, the Russians, and the terrible Poles, our next-door neighbours—there was always someone in our history to fear. And, of course, he told us about the brave and fierce Cossacks riding wild horses and waving their banners and sabres. Continuous fighting and killing for freedom and justice and survival, that is what history is....Like all nationalists, Pan Yurchenko thought that the only history worthy of attention was the one he taught us.[80]

The UNRRA director of the camp encountered the same problems when he, on the one hand, deemed the education as "[i]n general very good," but, on the other, warned of a "nationalistic tendency."[81] In 1953 the Minister of the Interior of Lower Saxony, too, was alarmed by the "nationalistische Verhetzung der Kinder" (nationalistic incitement of children) in Ukrainian DP schools.[82]

Another former pupil of the Taras Shevchenko Gymnasium in Heidenau, Mr. Iaremchuk, traces the motives behind the strong emphasis that was placed on education and explains its nationalistic charging: "The administration of the camp took much interest in the youth and schools, because they saw in them the future of Ukrainians and of Ukraine in general."[83]

National identity was therefore decisively shaped in the schools, and "children were nationalized through education."[84] Another former Heidenau pupil, Mr. Iavorivs´kyi, gives a good example of the exclusionary codification of national identity. He recalls that one of his teachers, Symon Vozhakivs´kyi, who was the SUM leader for the British zone, asked his classmate, Vera Eberlein, to elaborate on Ukrainian folk songs. Her peers thought that her report was nearly perfect and that it "demonstrated her love of Ukrainian folk songs." Mr. Vozhakivs´kyi

80. Memoirs of Mrs. Lindley, "Heidenau 1945–49," 9–10, PAJHA.
81. UNRRA Team 225 Monthly Welfare Report, Heidenau, 11 March 1947, UNRRA, S-0429-0005-04, UNA.
82. Cited in Anne-Kathrin Topp, *Vom ukrainischen DP zum heimatlosen Deutschen: Ukrainer und ihre Nachfahren in Westdeutschland nach 1945* (Bremen: Univ. Bremen, 2010), 33.
83. Mr. Iaremchuk to Jan-Hinnerk Antons, 26 April 2007, PAJHA.
84. Daria Markus, "Education," 194.

had no complaints regarding the content either, but he shouted at the girl nevertheless: "Та що ти кажеш? Та ж ти німка!" (What are you saying? You are a German!). Her classmates did not dare move, and the girl started weeping quietly.[85] In the eyes of that nationalist pedagogue, the girl's Ukrainian patriotism could not outweigh her German heritage.

A second example from Mr. Iavorivs´kyi's recollections also concerns the aggressive nationalist atmosphere in his school. He mentions another classmate, who "changed his ethnic identity to Polish" after leaving the DP camp. In school and most probably in the whole camp, it was evidently not advisable to be identified as being Polish, so this classmate spoke Ukrainian as long as he lived in Heidenau. These two cases demonstrate that the issue of the hybridity and fragility of national identities could not be resolved even in the "pressure tank" of a DP camp. On the contrary, the essentialist type of nationalism that was predominant excludes certain individuals from the national collective a priori.

Teachers had always played a major role in the Ukrainian national movement,[86] and without a doubt did so in many DP camps, too. They rarely limited their advocacy of the nationalizing process to school, but often served as speakers at public national functions and were members of many organizations. A prime example is Fylymon Pobihushka. Besides teaching at the Taras Shevchenko Gymnasium in Heidenau, he also served as a priest of the UHKTs and as a local Plast chaplain.[87] Later, he held higher positions in the church hierarchy,[88] devoted himself to the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations,[89] SUM,[90] and the Medical-Charitable Service (Sanitarno-Kharytatyvna Sluzhba, SKhS),[91] and finally became a member of the UTsDK.[92] In the eyes of their pupils, these teachers were people of absolute authority, who employed the autocratic

85. Mr. Iavorivs´kyi to Jan-Hinnerk Antons, 28 June 2011, PAJHA.

86. Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 238; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 239; Motyl, *Turn to the Right*, 150; Bruder, *"Den ukrainischen Staat,"* 53.

87. Philemon Pobihuszka, Fallbezogene Akten des ITS ab 1947 (ITS files on individual cases as of 1947), 6.3.3.2, TD-file 927112, ITS; Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokiv," 147, 154.

88. Wojtowicz, *Geschichte der Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche*, 61–62.

89. "ABN rozhortaie svoiu pratsiu," *Ranok*, no. 47, 19 November 1949, 3.

90. List of delegates to the zonal SUM congress of the British Zone, 1948, SUM folder, Tabory ukraïns´kykh peremishchenykh osib na terytoriï Nimechchyny (Ukrainian DP Camps on German Territory), UVU.

91. "Z'ïzd Kraiovoho Predstavnytstva SKhS na brytiis´ku zonu Nimechchyny," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 49, 10 April 1949, 1.

92. Report of monthly UTsDK-IRO meeting, Hamburg, 29 August 1951, L'Organisation internationale des Réfugiés (International Refugee Organization), AJ/43/792, Archives nationales Paris (National Archives, Paris).

and strict methods of Habsburg schools of the turn of the century.[93] Yet, many of the schools had high-profile teaching staff, like former university professors, and quite a few graduates started academic careers and remember their school days fondly.[94]

3. Usable Pasts

After assessing the ways in which the arts, churches, language, and school education affected the nationalization of the community, a key element that was not only a further tool for spreading national awareness, but also crucial for defining what constitutes a nation still needs to be examined: the dominant historical narrative. Commemorative days and national holidays are excellent means for disseminating a historical narrative, and there were plenty of these in the DP camps. They reached beyond the readership of émigré newspapers, included illiterate people, and could hardly be avoided by camp inhabitants. In the context of nation building, they served two purposes: providing content and providing form. First of all, commemorations define what constitutes the nation through the selection of occasions that are worthy of remembrance. Historical events are interpreted, reframed, charged with emotions, and mythologized. Second, on the performative level, the collective communicative act of commemorating creates the nation. It is aimed at a select group of participants and defines who belongs to the nation. The collective action makes them experience the nation and strengthens the feeling of belonging. Conversely, nonparticipants are excluded from the nation.[95]

The way in which commemorative events were held in the Ukrainian DP camps differed only slightly from camp to camp. A typical example is the national function held in honor of Symon Petliura and Ievhen Konovalets´ in the Braunschweig DP camp in 1949. The day started with morning services of the UHKTs and the UAPTs. At noon the camp residents gathered at symbolic graves on the main square of the camp to hold requiems under Ukrainian flags flying at half-mast. In the afternoon, the youth organizations SUM and Plast conducted a military-style

93. See Markus, "Education," 193.
94. See Antons, *Ukrainische Displaced Persons*, 316–20.
95. Konrad Ehlich, "Politische Feiern als kommunikatives Handeln," in *Neues Europa—alte Nationalismen: Kollektive Identitäten im Spannungsfeld von Integration und Ausschliessung; Analysen und Perspektiven*, ed. Helmut Guggenberger and Wolfgang Holzinger (Klagenfurt: Drava, 1993), 117–44.

memorial march, and in the evening, professors or teachers delivered lectures on the reasons for the celebration. The commemorative day ended with a concert by a group of bandura players and the collective singing of patriotic folksongs.[96]

What was the content of the commemorating agenda? Which historical events shaped the concept of the Ukrainian nation? The most integrating figures in Ukrainian history are, as in most other national histories, writers. They are unlikely to be instrumentalized for partisan politics, but are portrayed as representatives of an inclusive and intellectually potent national culture. Therefore, those writers who had stood at the vanguard of the idealized Ukrainian nation were honored at various occasions. In most camps there were annual celebrations of the writers Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, and numerous schools, artistic groups, and institutions were named after them.[97] Their artistic importance was connected to a national meaning. For example, an inevitable speech about "Taras Shevchenko and the nation" was given at the special evening events (*akademiï*) at each Shevchenko anniversary, whereas his social critique was not spotlighted. A special occasion for celebrating the Ukrainian language as a constitutive element of the nation was the 150th anniversary of the publication, in 1798, of Ivan Kotliarevs´kyi's *Eneïda*, which is regarded as the first literary work written in the modern Ukrainian language.[98]

The commemoration agenda of the DP camps began with a much earlier historical era, with the hetmans of the early modern period, who were assigned a national mission; Hetmans Bohdan Khmel´nyts´kyi and Ivan Mazepa, in particular, were honored for their fight against Poland and Russia, respectively. The OUN-B began naming places and streets after Khmel´nyts´kyi as soon as the Germans pushed the Soviet forces eastwards in 1941,[99] and continued to do so in the DP camps. Incorporating historical figures was not confined to the Ukrainian nationalists, however; the Soviet authorities, too, used the ever-popular Khmel´nyts´kyi—as a symbol of Ukrainian-Russian unity.[100]

96. "Z zhyttia taboriv," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 60, 26 June 1949, 4.
97. Ibid., no. 58, 12 June 1949, 4; Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokiv," 153.
98. "Z zhyttia taboriv," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 58, 12 June 1949, 4. By celebrating the "one-hundredth" anniversary, the newspaper reduced the time span of the existence of the literary language by about fifty years.
99. Bruder, *"Den ukrainischen Staat,"* 144.
100. Andreas Kappeler, "From an Ethnonational to a Multiethnic to a Transnational Ukrainian History," in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, ed. Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 51–80, here 53–54.

The most prominent figures in the national narrative were the protagonists of the "great uprising of the nation,"[101] who spearheaded efforts to form a state between 1917 and 1921. Interestingly, the central figure of Ukrainian nation building, Mykhailo Hrushevs´kyi, who came to terms with Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s, was mostly ignored as a national hero after Ukrainian nationalism's "turn to the right" in that decade, and he continued to be disregarded after nationalism's second shift to the right of the political spectrum during postwar exile. Moreover, Hrushevs´kyi's inclusive concept of the Ukrainian nation did not find much acceptance. In contrast, Symon Petliura, who was highly criticized by right-wing nationalists and accused of being a traitor to *sobornist´* (unity) until his assassination in 1926, became the most honored national hero.[102] In the DP camps, it was veteran organizations of the UNR in particular who paid tribute to their former *otaman*. On the twentieth anniversary of his assassination, veterans erected a monument to Petliura in Heidenau, which outlived the DP camp and can be found today in the Ukrainian section of the local cemetery (see fig. 4, below).

Besides Petliura, Ievhen Konovalets´, the founder of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, was prominent on the commemoration agenda. On many occasions, the two were honored together as the most important leaders of Ukrainian national aspirations.[103]

Even the twentieth-century Hetman Pavlo Skoropads´kyi, who led a German puppet government for some months in 1918, was able to garner support beyond his royalist followers in the DP camps. Their comparatively active role was due in part to the fact that he and his followers had been in Germany since the early 1920s and availed themselves of a small party apparatus. In 1948, Metropolitan Polikarp conducted a requiem (*panakhyda*) in Heidenau for the hetman, who had died in 1945, during which the high school principal Serhii Molchanivs´kyi praised the positive aspects of his rule.[104] The same year, the

101. "Z ukraïns´koho zhyttia," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 2, 9 May 1948, 4.

102. Frank Golczewski impressively analyzes how the 1926 trial of his assassin, Samuel Schwartzbart, in Paris helped reframe Petliura as a national martyr. See Frank Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer, 1914–1939* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 496–501.

103. For commemorations at Hallendorf and Braunschweig, see "Z zhyttia taboriv," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 60, 26 June 1949, 4. For a discussion of political commemorations in the churches, see Wojtowicz, *Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche*, 170; Henrike Anders, *Ukrainisch-katholische Gemeinden in Norddeutschland nach 1945*, Osteuropa 35 (Münster: Lit, 2003), 122.

104. P. S., "Vshanuvannia pam'iaty Ia. V. P. Het´mana Pavla v tabori Haidenav," *Svitanok*, no. 1, 28 July 1948, 4. Taborova kolektsiia, UVU.

Figure 4. Monument to Symon Petliura, commemorating the twentieth anniversary of his assassination. Heidenau cemetery. Photo: Jan-Hinnerk Antons.

Hetmanists conducted a successful DP camp fundraising campaign for a small Hetman chapel and burial vault in Wiesbaden.[105] This indicates that with regards to the commemoration agenda, Ukrainian statehood per se was the inclusive consideration, whereas political programs were secondary matters.

Alongside the deceased leaders of the national movement, two events of national sacrifice framed the commemoration agenda. These were the Battle of Kruty, in which some 400 ardent Ukrainian students were

105. "Uporiadzhennia mohyly Sv. Pam. Het´mana Pavla," *Svitanok*, no. 1, 28 July 1948, 4. Taborova kolektsiia, UVU. Although several thousand Reichsmark (which became practically worthless soon afterward) were collected, the chapel in Skoropads´kyi's birthplace Wiesbaden was never built, and his grave remained in Oberstdorf.

massacred by a far superior Soviet army in 1917, and the Battle of Bazar, a similar incident in 1921, in which the last resistance to the Bolsheviks collapsed and the 359 captured Ukrainian soldiers allegedly chose to be shot rather than join the communist forces. These events were mythologized in the 1930s by Volodymyr Ianiv, an important ideologist of the OUN and later commander of the Ukrainian DP camp in Kiel, along the lines of the German *Langemarck* myth.[106] Even so, these events were critically discussed in the DP camp press, with the Hetmanist paper *Ranok*, in particular, accusing the UNR government of having acted irresponsibly by sending Ukrainian teenagers into a hopeless battle without proper weapons.[107]

Other disputed events on the historical agenda were the distinct commemorative events of the two OUN factions. The Mel´nyk side honored its high-ranking cadres, Omelian Senyk and Mykola Stsibors´kyi, who were murdered on 30 August 1941 in Zhytomyr, allegedly by its rival, the OUN-B. The archpriest Ihor Hubarzhevs´kyi[108] of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, who had emigrated from Heidenau to London, was sharply criticized in the press for highlighting their importance for the Ukrainian independence struggle.[109] The OUN-B regularly honored its martyrs, Vasyl´ Bilas and Dmytro Danylyshyn, who assassinated a Polish post office clerk in 1932 and were subsequently hanged by the Polish authorities.[110] The political split was not confined to the intellectual and symbolic spheres in these cases, but had concrete repercussions for camp life. For instance, another pupil from Heidenau reported that she wanted to present a poem at a commemorative event connected to the OUN-M, but was prevented from doing so by her outraged father, who was a loyal Bandera follower.[111] However, her remark indicates the general nationalist consensus as well: "Die einen gingen mit der Partei Mel´nyk und die anderen mit Bandera. Und das konnte man nur dann spüren, wenn Nationalfeiertage organisiert wurden, wissen Sie, mit Referaten. Meistens waren sie zusammen, das war sehr, sehr

106. Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer*, 552.
107. Khoma Brut, "Tetereva z zapliushchenymy ochyma," *Ranok*, no. 11, 25 December 1948.
108. Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokiv," 153.
109. "Politykanstvo v tserkvi," *Ranok*, no. 45, 22 October 1949, 4.
110. "Khronika," *Ranok*, no. 12, 1 January 1949, 5. For detailed discussion of these two questionable heroes, see David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2007), 88.
111. Mrs. Kovalenko, interview by Jan-Hinnerk Antons, 18 February 2007, transcript, p. 9, PAJHA.

wichtig" (There were those who went with the Mel´nyk party and those who went with Bandera. And you could only sense it when national commemorations were organized, you know, with lectures. Most of the time they were together, this was very, very important).[112]

One occasion for remembrance that was difficult to present in a heroic light was the Great Famine of 1932–1933, deliberately brought about during Stalin's forced collectivization campaign. It was especially evident demographically in camps that were dominated by eastern Ukrainians. The secondary school at the Lysenko camp in Hannover, for example, had no grades six and seven at all in the 1945–1946 school year.[113] The term "Holodomor" had not been introduced yet, and on many occasions the catastrophe that claimed about three to four million lives in Ukraine[114] was portrayed as a *trahediia* (tragedy) without genocidal motivation being ascribed to the murderous famine policies of the Soviet authorities.[115] However, some voices tried to make it fit into the struggle-for-freedom narrative. In his speech at a flag-blessing ceremony in Heidenau, Symon Vozhakivs´kyi, the head of SUM in the British zone, said: "Навіть жертви жахливого в світі нечуваного голоду в 1933 р. не принесли катам 20 століття бажаного успіху. Чистий, несплямлений прапор орг. СУМ'у, освячений кров'ю найкращих синів України, держить молодь міцно в своїх руках" (Even the victims of the most terrible famine known to the world in 1933 did not grant the desired success to the hangmen of the twentieth century. The youth holds the pure, untainted flag of the SUM organization, hallowed by the blood of Ukraine's finest sons, firmly in its hands).[116]

What we find in this expression is, on the one hand, the motif of the intentional killing of Ukrainians because of their nationality, and, on the other, the transformation of famine victims into martyrs of the national struggle for freedom. In doing so, Vozhakivs´kyi ascribes meaning to the death of millions of Ukrainians and integrates the Soviets' brutal starvation policy into a narrative of the Ukrainians' struggle for freedom, which stimulates belonging and identity.

112. Ibid.
113. *Biuleten´ taboru im. M. Lysenka*, no. 154, 24 February 1946. Displaced Persons Camps in Austria and Germany papers, SSS.
114. Andrea Graziosi, Lubomyr A. Hajda, and Halyna Hryn, introduction to *After the Holodomor: The Enduring Impact of the Great Famine on Ukraine*, ed. Andrea Graziosi, Lubomyr A. Hajda, and Halyna Hryn (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, 2013), xvi.
115. "Z ukraïns´koho zhyttia," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 2, 9 May 1948, 4.
116. "Posviachennia Sumivs´koho prapora v tabori Haidenav," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 55, 22 May 1949, 3.

Presenting Ukraine as a victim of neighboring powers was a common feature of commemorative events, while anniversaries of declarations of Ukrainian statehood, like the proclamation of the UNR on 22 January 1918; the date of 1 November 1918, when Ukrainian forces captured Lviv; and the date 30 June 1941, when Iaroslav Stets´ko proclaimed Ukraine's independence in Lviv, memorialized events that were interpreted positively.[117] The same applies to the remembrance of the UNR winter offensive of 1919.[118]

Even when there was some dissent, as mentioned above, the general commemoration agenda was widely accepted. This broad scope, which included a wide range of nationalist groupings, is illustrated by a concert held in the Ukrainian DP camp in Bathorn in spring 1948. It praised not only Petliura, Konovalets´, and Hrushevs´kyi as heroes of the "great uprising of the nation," but also "a countless number of other heroes, known and unknown, of the First and Second World Wars" (незчисленну кількість інших, знаних і незнаних Героїв першої і другої світової війни).[119] Political icons that represented a variety of *Weltanschauungen* were thus reduced to a national consensus: the will to establish Ukrainian statehood. From the historiographical point of view, the construction of a single Ukrainian struggle for freedom is extremely difficult. The different political motivations of all these heroes from both world wars were disavowed here. Ukrainians had fought in opposing military formations and had fired at each other. The same is true of the Ukrainian civil war (1917–1921), in which supporters of a Ukrainian state disputed its characteristics by force of arms.

Nevertheless, a strong group identity manifested itself during the commemoration of these events in the DP camps. One element of the inclusive feature was the exclusion of those who did not attend them, as *Ukraïns´ke slovo* exemplified. The keen interest in the concert at Bathorn, mentioned above, led to the assembly hall being overcrowded, prompting the newspaper to comment derisively that "Ukrainian citizens filled the hall completely, while some 'Ukrainians' did not want to attend the ceremony for some reason" (Українські громадяни виповнили залю вщерть, а деякі "українці" в цьому святі участи чомусь не схотіли взяти).[120] The quotation marks around the word "Ukrainians" imply that those who did not attend such an *akademiia*

117. "Z zhyttia taboriv," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 58, 12 June 1949, 4; Wojtowicz, *Geschichte der Ukrainisch-Katholischen Kirche*, 174.
118. "Khronika," *Ranok*, no. 13, 8 January 1949, 3.
119. "Z ukraïns´koho zhyttia," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 2, 9 May 1948, 4.
120. Ibid.

are not worthy of being regarded as full-fledged members of the nation. Conversely, the participants formed a unity of real patriots.

When one summarizes the historical narrative as outlined above, the result may not seem very surprising at first glance. Each historical event worth remembering is linked to Ukraine's struggle for independence. All the heroes and events are directly connected with the struggle against the national enemies—Russia, first and foremost, followed by Poland. What is indeed more surprising is what is missing. Most strikingly, no liberation day was celebrated in the Ukrainian DP camps, in sharp contrast to Jewish or Polish camps. Many forced laborers, who comprised more than half of the camp population, had undoubtedly been freed from terrible oppression, and had waited years for that day. But they seemed to have no collective voice in the DP camp communities. Instead, Ukrainian DPs celebrated the anniversaries of the founding of their camps.[121] In this way, they were interpreted as places of refuge that were created by the community itself, and their founding marked the birth of a new political diaspora.

The same pattern can be found in the honoring of veterans. At national functions, mothers who had lost sons fighting in the SS Galicia Division were venerated.[122] Meanwhile, slave laborers were not honored at all, and their sufferings were rarely mentioned. Even OUN-B members who had been imprisoned in concentration camps and later formed the League of Ukrainian Political Prisoners (Liga Ukraïns´kykh Politychnykh V'iazniv, LUPV), complained that their comrades did not recognize their sufferings and did not want to even hear about them.[123]

This blank spot existed because the narrative of a national struggle against Russia and Poland was applied to the Second World War. The war was not remembered primarily in the context of German aggression and occupation, the extermination of a significant proportion of

121. On the first anniversary of the Heidenau DP camp, see Davydenko, "Z-pered 25 rokiv," 148–49; on the first anniversary of the Dorsten DP camp, see "Rokovyny odnoho taboru," *Luna*, no. 34, 6 October 1946, 3; on the fourth anniversary of the Bielefeld DP camp, see "Z zhyttia taboriv," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 58, 12 June 1949, 3.
122. Mr. Iavorivs´kyi to Jan-Hinnerk Antons, 1 October 2010, PAJHA. The biggest union of Ukrainian veterans, the Soiuz Ukraïns´kykh Veteraniv (SUV), formed in 1945, also allowed former SS soldiers, members of the *Nachtigall* Battalion, and other collaborators in its ranks. See Lev Kokodyns´kyi, "Ukraïns´ki veterans´ki kombatants´ki orhanizatsiï v Regensburzi," in *Regensburg: Statti, spohady, dokumenty; Do istoriï ukraïns´koï emigratsiï v Nimechchyni pislia Druhoï svitovoï viiny*, ed. Omelian Kushnir et al., Ukraïns´kyi arkhiv 40 (New York: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1985), 434.
123. Anna Holian, *Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism: Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 225.

Ukraine's population, the service of millions of Ukrainians in the Red Army, or the extensive use of additional millions of Ukrainians as slave laborers, but rather in the context of the national struggle for freedom that was predominantly directed against the Soviet Union. In its structure, the narrative ironically resembled the Soviet narrative of the Great Patriotic War in that it marginalized unheroic events. The only fixed date in the commemoration agenda connected to the war years was the failed declaration of independence in 1941 by collaborators who had taken part in Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. In this context, there was no need to talk about slave workers, who in fact rarely spoke out, since the leading political figures in the DP community were, after all, almost exclusively refugees, including prewar émigrés. They were in better health, better educated, and politically far more experienced than the former slave laborers. In their view, the slave laborers had done nothing to help achieve Ukrainian independence. Thus, an important explanation for not celebrating the day of liberation is that the Ukrainian nationalists' war was primarily directed against the Soviet Union—and it was not over yet.

Analysis of the historical narrative and its reflections on the Second World War may answer another question as well: Why were there no violent conflicts between former collaborators from the military and administrative sectors and bona fide Nazi victims, like slave laborers, when they formed a new Ukrainian community in the DP camps? Although the difference between a volunteer collaborator and a conscript may have been hardly perceptible sometimes, they definitely assumed opposing roles in the Nazi regime. It may well have been the case in the camps, for instance, that a former slave laborer met the village elder from her hometown who had selected her for deportation to Germany; or even that a concentration camp inmate encountered a former guard. However, there are no reports of conflicts of this kind. In contrast, there are plenty of reports of political conflicts between the OUN-B and its opponents. It seems as if the narrative of the anti-Soviet struggle bridged or at least concealed the conflicts that arose from the opposing roles held under Nazi rule. The Soviets still posed a serious threat to the Ukrainian DPs, whereas the Nazis had been vanquished.

A second explanation may be the supremacy of the OUN-B over all other political forces. This dominance made it nearly impossible for anyone to oppose the "struggle-for-freedom" narrative. Opposing it meant abandoning the nationalist, anti-Soviet consensus that reached far beyond OUN fellowship, but followed the OUN dictum, "If you are not with us, you are against us." Anyone who dared criticize any anti-Soviet action ran the risk of being perceived as pro-Soviet. And

to be considered a *moskal´* was the worst thing that could happen to someone in a Ukrainian DP camp. When criticism of collaboration with the Germans was expressed in public, it had severe consequences for the "traitor," as the historian and former UNR secretary Panas Fedenko discovered after he accused some of his fellow Ukrainians of having cooperated with the Nazis; he was subsequently heckled at an assembly and had to leave the hall for his own safety.[124] The circulation of this kind of news by Ukrainian newspapers served as a warning to others who might be tempted to "foul their own nest."

The consequences could be even more severe. The Security Service of the OUN-B (Sluzhba Bezpeky) is accused of having assassinated Soviet spies as well as political opponents in the DP camps.[125] In some cases, DPs sought the protection of the Allied Powers. The British commander of a Ukrainian DP camp in Bielefeld reported in January 1946: "I have a man here who is conversant with the activities and aims of BANDERIWZI and willing to give what information he can, but only on my personal pledge of secrecy, as he is afraid of being murdered. I would like to point out that on the evening of 25 Dec 46 an attempt was made to assassinate the Camp Commandant's secretary, and on the following day the Camp Commandant himself was attacked and nearly lost his life at the hands of some roughs in the Camp, put up to it by the more intelligent members of BANDERIWZI."[126] Similar concerns were expressed by I. W. Kossarenko-Kossarewytsch (Vasyl´ Kosarenko-Kosarevych), the head of the anti-Banderite Union of Ukrainian Political Prisoners. He alerted British Major Falkoner to "SOS calls from compatriots in the American and British zones" who suffered from the OUN-B's terror regime: "Their leadership pretends to be alone competent and entitled to represent the whole Ukrainian people at home and abroad and to determine the thinking and acting of all Ukrainians

124. "'Populiarnist´' ministriv U.N.R.," *Ranok*, no. 1, 14 October 1948, 3. Liberal newspapers from the American zone, however, repeatedly criticized collaboration. See Kulyk, "Role of Discourse," 226.

125. Maruniak, *Ukraïns´ka emigratsiia*, 248–49; Correspondence of the British Foreign Office, Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence: Activities of the Ukrainian Underground Movement in the USA and Elsewhere, FO 371/77585, TNA; Richard Breitman and Norman J. W. Goda, *Hitler's Shadow: Nazi War Criminals, U. S. Intelligence, and the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives, [2010]), 77; Olena Petrenko also mentions the fear of being murdered, see Olena Petrenko, *Unter Männern: Frauen im ukrainischen nationalistischen Untergrund 1944–1954* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, Brill Deutschland, 2018), 187.

126. Major K. Goudie to 510 R-Det Minden, 5 January 1946, COGA(BE) PW/DP: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, FO 1052/365, TNA.

everywhere. Therefore, they try to eliminate all the nonconformists to [their] own pattern with all possible means as the German fascists have done and as the Russian Bolsheviks continue to do....They are known as 'Bandera-men' with an anonymous leadership under the name UHWR (Ukrajinska Holowna Wyzwolna Rada, i.e. The Ukrainian Chief-Counsel of Liberation)."[127]

While it was daring to challenge the struggle-for-freedom narrative from within the community by talking about collaboration with the Nazis, some accusations of collaboration and the committing of atrocities came from the outside. They were rejected as attempts to defame the Ukrainian people. For instance, *Ukraïns´ke slovo* reported an incident in which a Ukrainian immigrant in the U.S. was allegedly wrongfully accused of having served as a local commander of the German police and to have participated in the extermination of Jews. The accusers, however, were portrayed as malevolent pro-Soviet Jews, so that the Ukrainian émigré appeared to be the victim of an anti-Ukrainian, Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy.[128] This denialist view remained dominant for decades, leading John-Paul Himka to label Ukrainian war crimes a blank spot in the diaspora even in 2005.[129]

Conclusion

So what happened to the Ukrainian nation in the "nutshell" that was the DP camps? After the Second World War a new Ukrainian diaspora evolved in postwar Germany, reproducing the regional, confessional, and social diversity of the whole country, but lacking its ethnic and ideological variety. Consisting of former forced laborers, anti-Soviet refugees, Nazi collaborators, and prewar émigrés, it had two features that bound it together: one was the determination to form a Ukrainian nation, separate from Russians and Poles; and the other was opposition to the Soviet political system.

Powerful political actors pursued the homogenization of cultural, political, and historical frames of reference. The struggle to nationalize the community thus allowed the slave laborers to vanish from the

127. I. W. Kossarenko-Kossarewytsch to Major H. Falkoner, 62 HQ, CCG BAOR Bünde, 25 December 1946, COGA(BE) PW/DP: Ukrainian Displaced Persons, FO 1052/364, TNA.

128. "Zhertva fal´shyvykh donosiv," *Ukraïns´ke slovo*, no. 60, 26 June 1949, 2.

129. John-Paul Himka, "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora," *Spaces of Identity* 5, no. 1 (2005): 9–24, https://doi.org/10.25071/1496-6778.7999.

discourse, for history outside the narrative of the national struggle for freedom was not worth recounting. Language, religion, and culture also had narrow frameworks. Transgressions were sanctioned and often met with stigmatization and exclusion. Marta Dyczok once praised the new freedom of national expression for Ukrainians in the DP camps.[130] While that was undeniably true, it was accompanied by new ways of reducing personal freedom of cultural orientation, as well as freedom of opinion, belief, and free speech.

Without judging the content, however, the national fixation of DP communities had a clearly positive capacity. It combatted so-called DP apathy, which the international aid organizations UNRRA and IRO noted as being the result of slave labor, traumatic experiences, and the continuation of dependent life in camp systems. Nationalists provided a goal to live for and claimed to know how to achieve it. Thus, they gave meaning to the monotony of camp life and helped people to deal with an uncertain future. In both ways, the nation-building project affected everyday life in the DP camps profoundly.

The restrictions mentioned above affected only a minority. Yet they concern the core problem of many nation-building projects, that of guaranteeing the rights of minorities. The DP period is unique in the history of Ukrainian nation building because of its laboratory-like characteristics. Like in a hothouse, favorable conditions supported the nationalizing of the community, yet not without the repercussions of an essentialist concept of nation.

Evaluating the actual success of these nation-building endeavors seems problematic because no one explicitly kept records during the experiment. At least several studies claim success in reinforcing national identity among the Displaced Persons.[131] Further insights may be gained from qualitative research on individual identity formation. Judging the long-term effects is difficult here due to the ephemeral nature of the "nutshell" situation. Nevertheless, this much is certain: Soviet Ukraine felt almost no repercussions of the experiment because of the lack of contacts. After 1946, only a few thousand Ukrainian DPs were repatriated at the very most. Most DPs emigrated to North America. Here, we do find traces of success. This "third wave" of immigration had a definite impact on the diaspora and its national outlook.[132] Many grandchildren

130. Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, 138.

131. Kulyk, "Role of Discourse," 232; Dyczok, *Grand Alliance*, 138. On non-Ukrainian DPs, see Laura Hilton, "Cultural Nationalism in Exile: The Case of Polish and Latvian Displaced Persons," *Historian* 71, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 280–317.

132. See Luciuk, *Searching for Place*; Vic Satzewich, *The Ukrainian Diaspora* (London: Routledge, 2002), 102.

of the Ukrainian DPs still feel they are Ukrainians, even if almost none of them considered going back to their home country when the ultimate goal of the nationalists was finally achieved in 1991. Hence, the effects on Ukraine remained minor. However, in spite of the civic concept of the Ukrainian nation embraced in 1991, identity politics became a crucial tool for garnering voter support since the end of the 1990s.[133] The use of language, history, and culture as principles of inclusion and exclusion inevitably leads to polarization—in the DP camps as well as in contemporary Ukraine. In the camps, though, a set of favorable conditions facilitated cultural homogenization.

133. See, e.g., Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "A Divided Nation? Reconsidering the Role of Identity Politics in the Ukraine Crisis," *Die Friedens-Warte* 89, no. 1–2 (2014): 249–67.